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My dissertation finds that the effects of institutional trading on stock 
price efficiency are significant and complicated. On one hand, I present 
evidence that institutional trading in general improves price efficiency. In 
particular, major stock market anomalies such as stock return momentum, 
post earnings announcement drift, and the book-to-market effect are much 
stronger in stocks with lower institutional trading volume. On the other, 
some institutional trading behaviors could hamper stock price efficiency 
even though institutions are generally rational arbitrageurs. Specifically, I 
show that when institutions act as positive-feedback traders, their trading 
contributes to stock return momentum and hampers prices efficiency. 
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The dramatic growth of institutional investors is one of the most im-
portant phenomena in the US stock market during the past three decades.
For example, institutional ownership of US common equities increased from
16% in 1965 to over 61% in 2002. Such rapid growth has motivated nu-
merous studies on institutions investors. For example, many paper study
the influence of institutional investors on various stock market phenomena
such as January anomaly, size premium, post earnings-announcement drift,
short sales constraint, high tech bubble, etc.1 Other papers examine how in-
stitutional investors affect corporate events including shareholder activism,
management compensation, CEO turnover, dividend policy, etc.2
How does institutional trading affect stock price efficiency? If institutions
have information advantage and act as ‘rational arbitrageurs’, then institu-
tions could improve stock market efficiency. Since institutions have become
the most important investors in the stock market, this research question is
very interesting and important. It not only helps academic researchers un-
derstand the dynamics of market efficiency but also help practitioners search
for potential profitable trading strategies.
Previous studies provide mixed evidence on the effects of institutional
trading on price efficiency. On one hand, some researchers show that institu-
tions have information advantage and therefore improve price efficiency. For
example, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) find that change in institutional own-
ership is positively related to both contemporaneous and subsequent stock
returns. Alangar, Bathala, and Rao (1999) document weaker price response
to dividend-change announcement for high institutional ownership firms. In
1See, for example, Sias and Starks (1997), Gompers and Metrick (2001), Ng and Wang
(2004), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Nagel (2005), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), etc.
2See, for example, Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Gillan
and Starks (2000), Grinstein and Michaely (2005), etc.
1
addition, Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000) observe weaker post-
earnings announcement drift for firms with higher institutional ownership.
Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2002) show that institutions purchase
stocks with positive cash flow news. Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007) re-
veal that institutions have access to analyst recommendations before they
are publicly released.
However, other studies build cases where institutions do not have infor-
mation advantage or their trading hampers price efficiency. For example
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) analyze hedge fund trades during high tech
bubble and find that hedge funds rode the bubble rather than attacking
it. A recent study by Frazzini (2005) also document that disposition effect
causes mutual funds’ sub-optimal trading behavior which intensifies post
earnings-announcement drift. In addition, there is a huge literature debat-
ing on whether mutual funds managers have superior information or stock
picking skills. 3
My dissertation shows that the effects of institutional trading on stock
price efficiency are significant and complicated. Specifically, I find evidence
that institutional trading in general improves price efficiency, but particu-
lar institutional trading behavior could nevertheless hamper stock price ef-
ficiency. My dissertation presents results from two aspects: 1) Consistent
with institutional trading improving overall price efficiency, I find that stock
market anomalies, such as return momentum, post earnings-announcement
3See, for example, Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and
Ross (1992), Grinblatt and Titman (1993), Grinblatt and Titman (1994), Malkiel (1995),
Ferson and Schadt (1996), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), Carhart
(1997), Dahlquist and Soderlind (1999), Wermers (1999), Wermers (2000), Bollen and
Busse (2001), Carhart, Carpenter, Lynch, and Musto (2002), Pastor and Stambaugh
(2002b), Pastor and Stambaugh (2002a), Cohen, Coval, and Pastor (2005), Chen, Je-
gadeesh, and Wermers (2000), Baks, Metrick, and Wachter (2001), etc.
2
drift, and the value premium are much stronger in stocks with lower fractions
of institutional trading volume. In addition, stocks with lower fractions of
institutional trading volume underperform stocks with higher fractions. 2)
I find that when institutions act as positive-feedback traders, their positive-
feedback trading contributes to stock return momentum and hampers price
efficiency.
The first chapter examines the effect of trader composition on price ef-
ficiency and therefore the cross-section of stock returns, where I evaluate
trader composition with the fraction of institutional trading volume in the
total trading volume of a stock. Trader composition of a stock could differ
substantially from its institutional ownership because shareholders are not
necessarily traders. If, for example, pension funds with a long investment
horizon hold 90% of a stock’s shares but rarely trade, then the stock could
have a low percentage of institutional trading volume despite high institu-
tional ownership. Similarly, a stock could have low institutional ownership
but be traded actively by institutions if a group of hedge funds or active
mutual funds own the security.
If institutions tend to be better informed and more sophisticated than
individuals, then higher fractions of institutional trading volume could lead
to greater price efficiency through two channels. First, active institutional
trading could help incorporate information into stock prices rapidly. Holden
and Subrahmanyam (1992), for example, show that aggressive competition
between informed traders could facilitate the information revelation process.
Moreover, several previous studies find that institutional trading can move
stock prices.4 As a result, informed institutional trading could speed up the
4Chan and Lakonishok (1997), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Chakravarty (2001), Griffin,
Harris, and Topaloglu (2003), and Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006) discuss the price impact
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information revelation process and move stocks prices towards their funda-
mental values.
The second channel through which trader composition affects price ef-
ficiency relies on the ‘limit of arbitrage’ intutition developed by DeLong,
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
When noise traders are prevalent, rational traders will be reluctant to arbi-
trage away mispricing, since such arbitrage will result in a loss if in the next
period noise traders’ misconceptions deepen and drive stock prices further
away from the fundamental values. Therefore, price efficiency could be lower
for stocks traded less by rational traders, in our case, institutional traders.
I first construct a trader composition measure that evaluates the fraction
of institutional trading volume in the total trading volume of a stock (hence-
forth FIT). I further decompose the FIT measure into fraction of institutional
buy volume and fraction of institutional sell volume. The average fraction of
institutional trading volume is 54% during 1980-2005, including a 28% buy
volume and a 25% sell volume. This result suggests that institutions account
for over half of the trading volume during 1980-2005.5
Trader composition is a new concept in the literature of institutional
investors, which is a different concept from change in institutional owner-
ship that is studied by a number of previous studies such as Nofsinger and
Sias (1999), Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003), and Sias, Starks, and Titman
(2006). In particular, these studies examine the determinants or influence of
change in aggregate institutional ownership (henceforth CIO). Trader com-
position and CIO are different concepts both economically and empirically.
of institutional trading.
5My sample is restricted to NYSE/AMEX firms because the trading volumes of Nasdaq
firms are inflated relative to NYSE/AMEX firms.
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Economically, CIO is the net change aggregated institutional ownership while
trader composition is the fraction of institutional trading volume in the to-
tal trading volume. Empirically, CIO is the aggregation of signed change in
the ownership across institutions, trader composition is the aggregation of
the absolute values of changes in institutional ownership (proxy of trading
volume) across institutions and then adjusted by the total trading volume.
Empirically, the correlation between the FIT measure and change in institu-
tional ownership is as low as 0.02.
Since trader composition is a new concept, I start with the determinants of
trader composition. The results show that both institutional ownership and
firm characteristics affect trader composition. However, the most important
determinant of a firm’s trader composition is its trader composition in the
previous period. In other words, trader composition is relatively persistent
over time.
I further examine the source of the aforementioned persistence in trader
composition and find evidence that it is related to information asymmetry.
Two theoretical models by Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) and Hirsh-
leifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) both suggest that when there is
information asymmetry and some investors learn information earlier than
others, investors will focus on some securities but ignore others with simi-
lar characteristics. Therefore, in the presence of informational asymmetry,
rational investors, in our case institutional investors, will concentrate their
trading in some stocks but ignore others in a period of time, leading to persis-
tent trader composition in this period. Consistent with these two theoretical
models, I find that trader composition is more persistent for firms with less
analyst coverage, a group associated with non-trivial information asymmetry.
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After exploring the determinants of trader composition, I investigate the
effects of trader composition on the cross-section of stock returns. I first
examine the direct effect of trader composition by testing two competing
hypothesis.
On one hand, according to the conclusion of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers,
and Waldmann (1990a), one would expect low FIT stocks to outperform
high FIT stocks because their paper suggests that stocks heavily traded by
noise traders earn higher returns. On the other hand, in the presence of
mispricing, low FIT stocks could underperform high FIT stocks if mispricing
is concentrated in low FIT stocks and if overpricing is the predominant form
of mispricing. Several studies have shown that overpricing is difficult to
arbitrage away because correcting overpricing often involves short sales which
could be costly or constrained.6 In addition, the profits of trading strategies
employing many stock market anomalies such as price momentum, the value
premium, and IPO underperformance come mainly from the short side, which
is also supportive of overpricing being the predominant form of mispricing.
Therefore low FIT stocks are overpriced and will earn lower returns in the
subsequent period.
The empirical results show that low FIT stocks earn lower returns, which
is consistent with the overpricing hypothesis but inconsistent with DeLong,
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a). For example, the bottom FIT
decile underperform the top FIT decile by 0.32 to 0.57 percent monthly
depending on different risk adjustments.
In addition to the aforementioned direct effect, I further analyze the ef-
6See, for example, Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002), Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002),
Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004), Nagel (2005) and Asquith, Pathak, and
Ritter (2005), for the discussion of short sales constraints.
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fects of trader composition on stock market anomalies. If low FIT stocks
are associated with less price efficiency, then apparent profit opportunities
should be stronger in low FIT stocks. Consistently, I find that three major
anomalies such as return momentum, post earnings-announcement drift and
the value premium (book-to-market effect) are much stronger in low FIT
stocks. For example, return momentum is 0.53% per month stronger in the
bottom FIT tercile than in the top FIT tercile; post earnings-announcement
drift is 0.50% per month stronger; and the value premium is larger by 0.63%
per month.7 These results are robust after controlling for other factors doc-
umented to affect these anomalies.
In order to separate the effects of trader composition from those of in-
stitutional ownership, I also construct a residual FIT measure (henceforth
ResFIT). The ResFIT measure, calculated as residuals from the regressions
of FIT on institutional ownership, is orthogonal to institutional ownership.
All the aforementioned effects of trader composition are robust with the Res-
FIT measure.
A contemporaneous paper by Boehmer and Kelley (2006) also observes
a positive relationship between fraction of institutional trading volumes and
price efficiency. However, my paper differs from Boehmer and Kelley (2006)
in several important ways. First, although both papers examine the effect of
trader composition, they focus on Hasbrouck (1993)’s price-based efficiency
measures while I study the cross-section of stock returns. Second, unlike
Boehmer and Kelley (2006), I investigate the determinants of trader com-
7Return momentum is monthly profit of six month/six month momentum strategy
proposed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Post earnings announcement drift is monthly
profit of a six-month rolling PEAD strategy proposed by Frazzini (2005) based on earnings
announcement shocks, and the value premium is monthly return difference between the
top and bottom decile of the book-to-market ratio.
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position to further understand this new conception. Third, Boehmer and
Kelley (2006) focus on the short-term effects of trader composition on an
intra-day or daily basis while my study examines the intermediate effects
of trader composition from one to six months. Last, their study employs a
proprietary database which covers a relatively short period from 2000-2003,
while my papers examines a much longer period from 1980-2005.
My study is also related to the literature of transient institutions intro-
duced first by Bushee (1998). In particular, Bushee (1998) classifies institu-
tions into transient and non-transient institutions according to how actively
they trade. He shows that firms with high ownership by transient institutions
tend to cut investment in research and development to meet the short-term
earnings goals. Bushee (2001) further find that high transient institutional
ownership could motivate various earnings management to boost up short-
term earnings. In addition, Collins, Gong, and Hribar (2003) finds that prices
of firms with high transient institutional ownerships more accurately reflect
the persistence of accruals. These papers provide evidence of the different in-
fluences between active and inactive institution investors. While they address
this question by examining institutional ownership of active institutions, my
paper directly examine the trading volume of institutional investors in the
total trading volume. The trader composition measure not only assigns more
weight to active institutional investors because they account for more trad-
ing volume, but also includes the trading volume of inactive institutional
investors, which could also be rational traders in the financial market.
The first chapter presents evidence that institutional trading generally
improves price efficiency. However, these findings do not necessarily conclude
that institutional trading always improves price efficiency. Since institutions
8
are very different in terms of investment goals, investment horizons, and they
adopt a wide range of trading strategies, some of their trading patterns could
potentially hamper price efficiency even though institutional in general act as
rational arbitrageurs. To investigate this possibility, in the second chapter I
examine the effect of a particular institutional trading pattern — institutional
positive-feedback trading — on stock return momentum and price efficiency.
The second chapter is also motivated by two theoretical studies DeLong,
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990b) and Hong and Stein (1999) which
suggest that positive-feedback trading can produce stock return momentum.
Specifically, their models both introduce a group of positive-feedback traders
who simply buy when prices rise and sell when prices fall. As a result of
the price pressure caused by such positive-feedback trading, stock return
momentum is generated. Interestingly, when discussing the identity of the
momentum traders in their model, Hong and Stein (1999) claim that “it
should be noted that a number of large and presumably sophisticated money
managers use what are commonly described as momentum approaches . . . ”
The second chapter is the first study to empirically show that, consistent
with the theoretical models by DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann
(1990b) and Hong and Stein (1999), positive-feedback trading by institutions
contributes to stock return momentum. In addition, this study further reveals
that positive-feedback trading by institutions destabilizes stock prices and
hence hampers market efficiency.
Despite the heavy empirical literature on return momentum and on in-
stitutional investors, the research on the impact of institutional positive-
feedback trading on stock return momentum has been relatively sparse. The
most related study to my paper is Nofsinger and Sias (1999), which addresses
9
this question by sorting stocks independently on past stock returns and in-
stitutional trading. They find that current stock returns increase in both
past stock returns and current institutional trading. In addition, regardless
of winners or losers, stocks that experience high volume of institutional buys
(sells) exhibit higher (lower) returns than the benchmarks with similar past
performance. However, as they point out, this relation is not free of the
endogeneity problem since they are examining the variables simultaneously.
That is, the positive relation between institutional positive-feedback trading
and return momentum that they observe can be due to institutional trend-
chasing. Moreover, their institutional holding data is on an annual basis,
which intensifies the endogeneity problem.
This paper takes a different approach by measuring the positive-feedback
trading by institutions at individual stock level. I create a measure, MT
(momentum trading), which evaluates the amount of institutional positive-
feedback trading on a stock during a certain period of time. On a scale
ranging between -5 and 5, a higher MT measure implies that institutions
are more likely to buy the stock when its past performance is good and/or
sell the stock when its past performance is poor. Moreover, I update the
ex-ante MT measure using previous data to avoid the endogeneity problem.
In particular, the MT measure of quarter t is calculated using the data of
institutional trading and stock returns during the two-year period up to the
end of quarter t-1.
Next, I examine the effect of institutional positive-feedback trading on
return momentum by exploiting the six-month-formation/six-month-holding
momentum strategy across MT levels. Consistent with the hypothesis that
positive-feedback trading by institutions contributes to stock return momen-
10
tum, I find strong empirical evidence that return momentum is increasing
in the ex-ante MT measure. For example, when firms are sorted into three
MT groups, the monthly momentum profit of the top MT tercile is 0.53%
higher than that of the bottom MT tercile. This difference is not only sta-
tistically significant, but also economically significant as well, compounded
to an annual difference of 8.58%.
Previous research has documented stronger return momentum in stocks
of smaller sizes, lower book-to-market ratios (henceforth BE/ME), higher
turnovers, lower analyst coverage, higher return volatility and shorter his-
tory.8 My further empirical results suggest that although institutional positive-
feedback trading is stronger in small stocks, high BE/ME stocks, high turnover
stocks, low coverage stocks, stocks with higher return volatility, and younger
stocks, the effect of institutional positive-feedback trading on return momen-
tum is robust after controlling for the effects of these variables.
This paper also has implications for whether institutional trading has
price impact. Although numerous studies have documented the positive re-
lationship between institutional trading and stock returns, this phenomenon
is not necessarily a result of the price impact of institutional trading. It
can also be explained, for example, by institutional information advantage
or institutional trend-chasing. For example, Chan and Lakonishok (1995),
Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Chakravarty (2001) and Sias, Starks, and Titman
(2006) find empirical evidence suggesting that institutional trading is capable
of moving stock prices. However, two other studies by Griffin, Harris, and
Topaloglu (2003) and Sias (2004) attribute the positive relationship between
8See Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), Daniel and Titman
(1999), Lee and Swaminthan (2000), Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005), and Zhang (2006) for
the relationships between stock return momentum and size, BE/ME, turnover, analyst
coverage, return volatility, and firm age.
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institutional trading and stock return to either informational advantage or
institutional trend-chasing. My paper contributes to this line of research by
providing new empirical evidence suggesting that institutional trading moves
stock prices when they act as positive-feedback traders.
In addition, this paper presents two pieces of empirical evidence suggest-
ing that institutional positive-feedback trading destabilizes stock prices and
hampers market efficiency. First, the price movements caused by institu-
tional positive-feedback trading are not accompanied by the corresponding
changes in analyst forecasts of earnings, indicating that institutional positive-
feedback trading is not triggered by market underreaction to information on
firms’ fundamentals; second, I observe much deeper long-term reversals in
momentum profits for the stocks that experience more institutional positive-
feedback trading, which is evidence that institutional positive-feedback trad-
ing drives stock prices further away from the fundamental values of the firms.
To summarize, my dissertation makes important contributions the current
finance literature.
First, my dissertation contributes to the literature of market efficiency
by showing that institutional trading has important yet complicated impact
on stock market efficiency. While institutional trading in general improves
price efficiency, some of their particular trading behaviors could hamper price
efficiency. In addition, stock market anomalies are significantly intensified
with the lack of institutional trading volume.
Second, my dissertation contributes to the literature of institutional in-
vestors. The rapid growth of institutional investors has motivated numerous
studies on the role of institutions in various stock market phenomena and
corporate events. Many studies focus on institution-individual composition
12
of shareholders as measured by institutional ownership. In contrast, trader
composition, i.e., which type of investors dominates the trades of a stock,
has been largely ignored. The first chapter thoroughly studies trader com-
position, which has been largely ignored by the current literature, and show
that trader composition has significant effects on price efficiency and the
cross-section of stock returns.
In addition, the second chapter for the first time create a firm-level mea-
sure of institutional positive-feedback trading, and reveals that institutional
positive-feedback trading contributes to stock return momentum and ham-
pers stock price efficiency.
13
1 Trader Composition, Price Efficiency, and
the Cross-Section of Stock Returns
1.1 Measuring trader composition
This section describes the measurement trader composition. There are three
potential methods to evaluate trader composition: split of trading volume
associated with institutions and individuals, split of the number of trades,
and split of the number of traders. Although all these methods reflect trader
composition, in this paper I choose the split of trading volume out of two
concerns. First, the number of trades by institutions and individuals is not
publicly available. Second, although the approximate number of institutional
traders can be inferred from institutional holdings data, the number of in-
dividual traders is not publicly available. In addition, even if trader num-
bers are available, the number of institutions would be so small compared
to individuals that any ratio of trader numbers would lack cross-sectional
dispersion.
This subsection describes the measurement trader composition. I con-
struct the FIT measure of a stock i in quarter t, i.e., fraction of institutional
trading volume in the total trading volume of stock i in quarter t, following
the two steps below:
Step1: I first calculate institutional trading volume (henceforth ITV) us-




|IOijt − IOijt−1| (1)
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where ITVit is institutional trading volume (adjusted by the stock’s total
shares outstanding) of stock i in quarter t. IOijt is institution j’s ownership
of stock i for quarter t, calculated as j’s share holdings of stock i divided
by i’s total shares outstanding at the end of quarter t. This formula first
approximates the trading volume of each institution by calculating the abso-
lute value of change in ownership, and then aggregates these absolute changes
across institutions to obtain the total institutional trading volume.






where TOit is total turnover of stock i in quarter t.
9 FITit aims at
measuring how actively institutions trade stock i in quarter t relative to
individuals.
The construction of the FIT measure is simple and straightforward. How-
ever, the issue of round-trip trades could bias downward the estimated insti-
tutional trading volume and therefore the FIT measure. For example, if an
institution purchases 1% of a stock’s shares and then sells it within the same
quarter, then the FIT measure will ignore these two trades because they are
not included in quarterly institutional ownerships.
Because of the issue of round-trip trades, the trader composition measure
actually reflects the fraction of trading volume from relatively long-term in-
stitutional investors. If an institution acts as day-trader of a stock and fre-
9In each month of quarter t, I divide total trading volume of stock i by its total shares
outstanding to obtain monthly turnover. I then sum up the three monthly turnovers in
quarter t to obtain TOit, total turnover of stock i in quarter t.
15
quently makes round-trip trades of the stock within a quarter, then a large
portion of the trading of this institution might not be included in the FIT
measures. Since different institutions have different trading frequency, the
FIT measure could represents trading of certain types of institutions but
ignore other institution types. For example, Carhart (1997) document that
mutual funds, which are relatively active institutional traders, have average
turnover of 77.3% a year, which is equal to a holding period of 15.5 months or
over five quarters, which is well above the one-quarter interval of our trading
volume calculation. Therefore, the FIT measure could capture the major-
ity of the mutual fund trading and less active institutions such as pension
funds, banks, or investment advisors. However, the FIT measure could miss
a significant amount of hedge fund trading or the trading of institutional
day-traders, since these institutions could trade at much higher frequency
than other institution types and incur large volumes from round-trip trades.
Therefore the effects of the FIT measure actually reflects the effect of the
trading volume from the relatively long-term institutional traders. As a re-
sult, the tests with the FIT measure indicates the effect of the trading from
relative long-term institutional traders on price efficiency.
In addition, the issue of double counting could bias upward the estimated
institutional trading volume and therefore the FIT measure, since the FIT
measure double counts the trades between two institutions. As a result, FIT
is ranging between 0 and 2 rather than between 0 and 1. For example, sup-
pose an extreme case where a stock i is traded only once, which is institution
A selling 1% of stock i’s total shares to institution B. Then the absolute
change in ownership will be 1% for both A and B, leading to an ITV of 2%.
Since turnover is 1%, the FIT measure in this case will be 2, calculated as
2% divided by 1%. Double counting occurs because the data does not al-
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low us to disentangle trades between two institutions and trades between an
institution and an individual.
In order to separately examine the effects of institutional buys and sells,
I further decompose the FIT measure into FIB, fraction of institutional buy
volume in the total trading volume, and FIS, fraction of institutional sell
volume in the total trading volume. In particular, if an institutions increase
(decrease) its ownership of a stock during a quarter, then I treat this change
as a buy (sell).
Some may argue that any effect of the FIT measure might be liquidity
effect because turnover is the denominator of FIT, and turnover itself is a
liquidity measure. To address this issue, I directly control for turnover by
creating a residual trader composition measure which are residuals from the
regression of the FIT measure on turnover. The residual FIT measure is
therefore orthogonal to turnover and able to eliminate the liquidity effect,
if any, introduced by turnover. I then repeat the tests with this turnover-
adjusted FIT measure and the results are very similar to the original FIT
measure. I also create an alternative turnover-adjusted FIT measure with
benchmark process. In particular, I subtract from the FIT of a firm the
average FIT measure of the turnover quintile the firm falls in. The results
are also very similar with this alternative turnover-adjusted FIT measure.
Therefore these results with the turnover-adjusted measures show that the
FIT effect is not caused by its correlation with liquidity.
17
1.2 Data and Sample Selection
I obtain quarterly institutional share holdings from the CDA/Spectrum In-
stitutional (13f) database, which contains the filings by institutions under
Section 13f of the Security and Exchange Act of 1934. Stock data such as re-
turns, price, shares outstanding and trading volume are obtained from CRSP,
while annual accounting data and quarterly earnings-announcement data of
the firms are obtained from COMPUSTAT. I obtain analyst coverage from
IBES and the benchmark portfolio returns of MKT, HML, SMB and UMD
from Kenneth French’s data library.10 My sample period starts from 1980
through 2005 because of the availability of 13f data.
My sample is the overlap of 13f and CRSP data. In addition, if in a
quarter an institution does not report holding of a stock in 13f but the stock
has a record in CRSP, I do not drop this stock but instead set the holding
of this institution to zero. When calculating the change in institutional
ownership of a quarter, I include only the institutions that report holdings
of at least one stock in 13f at both the beginning and the end of the quarter.
I apply this filter because of the entry-and-exit issue. Since only institutions
with total holdings over 100 million dollars are required to file 13f, some
institutions might report intermittently because of the fluctuation of total
holdings. Therefore I introduce this filter to control for the entries and exits
of institutions in the 13f database.
My sample is restricted to NYSE/AMEX firms because trading volumes
of Nasdaq stocks are inflated relative to those of NYSE/AMEX stocks by
different trading systems. In addition, I keep only the firms with CRSP
histories of at least six months. In order to control for the microstructure
10See http : //mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/datalibrary.html.
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effects, I drop the stocks priced below $5 and stocks with market capitaliza-
tions below NYSE 10% breakpoints, as did Jegadeesh and Titman (2001).
I also drop the firms with negative BE/ME. The following subsections will
introduce additional restrictions for some of the tests in this chapter.
1.3 Determinants of trader composition
1.3.1 Summary Statistics
My final sample contains 236,908 firm-quarter observations with the available
trader composition measures from the third quarter of 1980 to the last quarter
of 2005, with average 2,323 firms in each cross-section. Since the upper
limit is 2 for FIT and 1 for FIB and FIS, I winsorize FIT at 2 and FIB
and FIS at 1 in order to avoid data errors. Table 1 presents the sample
distributions of FIT, FIB and FIS. The mean FIT is 54% equal weighted
(62% value weighted), indicating that institutions account for over half of
the trading volume in the sample period. In addition, FIT, FIB and FIS
are rather dispersed cross sectionally, which shows that different stocks have
very different trader composition.
Table 1 also summarizes institutional ownership and firm characteristics
including market capitalization, BE/ME, beta, turnover, past return, resid-
ual analyst coverage, stock price, idiosyncratic volatility, dividend yield and
stock illiquidity. I examine Beta, firm size, BE/ME and past returns because
they affect stock returns. I further include analyst coverage, stock price,
stock illiquidity, idiosyncratic volatility (firm specific risk), and dividend yield
because previous studies observe that they are related to institutional own-
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ership.11 Last, I construct a dummy variable for S&P500 composite index
because trader composition might differ for index firms.
Beta (obtained from CRSP) is estimated annually with daily returns of
a stock in the previous calendar year; firm size is the natural log of a firm’s
market capitalization; BM/ME is the summation of a firm’s book equity and
deferred tax divided by the firm’s market equity; past return is the cumulative
return of a firm during the past six months. The residual analyst coverage is
calculated following Griffin and Lemmon (2002) by adjusting a firm’s analyst
coverage with average coverage of the firm’s NYSE size quartile. Turnover is
quarterly turnover of a stock by summing up three monthly turnovers during
the quarter, where monthly turnover is monthly trading volume divided by
shares outstanding. Dividend yield is a firm’s dividend payment per share
divided by its share price. I apply the accounting variables at fiscal year end
of t to the one-year period starting from the July of year t + 1. I winsorize
turnover, BE/ME and ITV at 99% cutoff points to control for the outliers
and data errors.
I estimate idiosyncratic volatility every month with a five-year rolling win-
dow procedure. Specifically, for each month t, I run a time-series regression
of a stock’s monthly excess returns on the monthly market excess returns
(MKT), SMB and HML for the five-year period up to t. Next, I calculate
idiosyncratic volatility of this firm as the standard deviation of residuals.12
I then apply the obtained idiosyncratic volatility to month t + 1. I only in-
clude the firms with more than 24 monthly returns in the five-year estimation
11See Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) and Grinstein
and Michaely (2005) for the relationship between institutional ownership, idiosyncratic
volatility and dividend yield.
12I adjust for three degrees of freedom when calculate the standard deviation so that the
estimate is unbiased. My results are not changed when I instead use CAPM or 4-Factor
Model to estimate idiosyncratic volatility.
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windows to avoid estimation errors.











where rt is the stock return on day t and volt is the reported dollar volume
on day t. The average is computed over all days in the samples for which
the ratio is defined, i.e. days with nonzero volume. This measure reflect the
return impact of a cumulative signed order flow. I estimated the illiquidity
measure annually and applied the estimated measure to the next calendar
year. Following Amihud (2002), I drop the firms with less than 200 valid
observations of volumes in the estimation period.13
1.3.2 Determinants of Trader Composition
Many previous studies investigate the relationships between institutional
ownership and firm characteristics such as size, BE/ME, past returns, stock
liquidity, etc.14 In contrast, the determinants of trader composition have
never been studied. This subsection is intended to address this research
question.
I start with Table 19 which presents firm characteristics across FIT groups.
Specifically, in each quarter I sort stocks into quintiles of FIT and report the
13This is a transformed Amihud (2002) measure suggested by Hasbrouck (2006). My
results are not changed when I estimate the original Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure
without taking the square root of the fractions in equation (7).
14An incomplete list includes Del Guercio (1996), Falkenstein (1996), Gompers and
Metrick (2001), Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), Badrinath and Wahal (2002), Bennett,
Sias, and Starks (2003), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Grinstein and Michaely (2005), and
Han and Wang (2005).
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time-series averages of the cross-sectional means of the characteristics for
each quintile. FIB and FIS are in the same quarter and the other vari-
ables are measured at the beginning of the quarter. Table 19 shows that
the fraction of institutional trading volume is positively related to FIS, FIB,
institutional ownership, firm size, analyst coverage, stock price and the S&P
500 dummy, and negatively related to dividend yield and illiquidity. The re-
lationships between FIT and turnover, beta and analyst coverage are mixed,
where both the top and bottom FIT quintiles have lower turnovers, betas
and coverages than the medium quintiles. In addition, FIT does not have
significant relationships with BE/ME ratios, past returns and idiosyncratic
volatilities.
Since Table 19 does not examine different firm characteristics simultane-
ously, I further run the following multivariate Fama-Macbeth regression.




Where FITit is FIT of stock i of quarter t; X’s include institutional ownership
and firm characteristics. All the independent variables are measured at the
beginning of quarter t. In order to control for the autocorrelation of FIT,
I also include the one quarter lag FIT into the independent variables. To
facilitate the evaluation of economic significance, I follow Chan, Jegadeesh,
and Lakonishok (1996) to transform all the independent variables except the
S&P500 dummy into standardized ranks between 0 and 1. Particularly, in
each cross-section, I rank stocks according their levels of a variable, and then
divided these ranks by the total number of stocks in this cross-section. In
this way, this variable is evenly spread between 0 and 1, where 0 represents
the minimum and 1 represents the maximum.
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Before running the regressions, I first report in Table 3 time-series aver-
ages of the cross-sectional correlations between the variables. The correlation
between FIT and lag FIT is as high as 0.68, which is evidence of strong persis-
tence in trader composition. Interestingly, the correlation between FIT and
lag institutional ownership is also as high as 0.48, indicating a strong posi-
tive relationship between traders composition and shareholder composition.
In the meantime, FIT is positively correlated with firm size, BE/ME, beta,
stock price, S&P500 dummy, and negatively correlated with past return, id-
iosyncratic volatility, dividend yield and the illiquidity measure. Since the
illiquidity measure and firm size are almost perfectly correlated (correlation
-0.86), to avoid the multi-collinearity problem, for the rest of the tests in this
section I use a residual illiquidity measure obtained from the cross-sectional
regression of illiquidity on firm size.
Table 4 reports the regression results. I start with Model (1) that regresses
FIT on its lag because of the strong autocorrelation of FIT shown in Table 3.
The coefficient of lag FIT is 0.93, significant at the 0.01 level. The Adjusted
R-square of 0.4183 indicates that lag FIT alone explains a substantial amount
of the variation in FIT. According to the coefficient of 0.93, the difference in
FIT between the top and bottom lag FIT quintiles is as high as 74.4%.15
Model (2) include firm characteristics other than lag FIT, which pro-
duces three major empirical results . First, the coefficient of lag FIT is only
slightly reduced from 0.93 in Model (1) to 0.89 in Model (2), which shows
that historical FIT has strong explanatory power even after controlling for
15The 74.4% difference is calculated as follows. Recall that lag FIT is standardized
between 0 and 1. Therefore the mean lag FIT is 0.90 for the top lag FIT quintile and
0.10 for the bottom lag FIT quintile. The difference in lag FIT is therefore 0.80. As a
result, the difference in FIT between the top and bottom lag FIT quintiles is 0.80 times
the coefficient 0.93, which leads to 74.4%.
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firm characteristics and institutional ownership. Second, the coefficient of
institutional ownership is as high as 0.23 and significant at the 0.01 level,
suggesting that trader composition is closely related to shareholder compo-
sition. Last, trader composition is also related to firm characteristics. In
particular, FIT is positively related to firm size, BE/ME, and illiquidity,
and negatively related to Beta, past returns, price, S&P500 dummy, analyst
coverage, idiosyncratic volatility, and dividend yield. Model (3) is similar
to Model (2) but excluding the lag FIT term, in which the coefficients of all
firm statistics remain the same sign and statistical significance. However, the
magnitudes of the coefficients are much larger than in Model (2), showing
that the lag FIT term subsumes much of the effects of firm characteristics.
Model (2) shows that five firm characteristics including institutional own-
ership, illiquidity, idiosyncratic return volatility, S&P 500 dummy and resid-
ual analyst coverage have the biggest coefficients next to the lag FIT mea-
sure, indicating that these firm characteristics also have significant effects on
trader composition as follows.
First, FIT increases in institutional ownership. This could be caused
by two facts. First, institutions know the stocks in their portfolios better,
so they tend to trade these stocks more frequently. Second, it could be a
mechanical relationship because institutions can only sell when they hold a
stock. Therefore ownership is positively related to institutional sell volume
and then total institutional trading volume. Model (5) and (7) suggest that
both explanations are valid, where both coefficients of institutional ownership
are significantly positive but the coefficient in the FIS regression is much
bigger in magnitude.
Second, FIT increases in illquidity. That is, FIT is lower for liquid stocks
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controlling for other characteristics. This interesting result is a sharp contrast
to the fact that institutions tend to hold liquid stocks.16 This result indicates
that while institutions hold more liquid stocks relative to individuals, they
tend to trade illiquid stocks more than individuals.
Third, FIT decreases in analyst coverage and S&P500 dummy controlling
for other characteristics. This result is interesting because institutions tend
to hold high analyst coverage firms and index firms.17 This result could
be related to two phenomena. First, on the institutions side, although index
funds hold a large number of index shares, they do not trade frequently other
than rebalancing. Second, on the individuals side, Odean (1999) finds that
for individual traders, the difficulty in searching for securities could lead to
a tendency to let their attention be directed by outside sources. As a result,
individuals tend to trade the stocks that attract their attention. Therefore,
individuals tend to trade index firms or firms with higher coverage because
these firms are associated with more events and greater media exposure,
which can lead to lower fractions of institutional trading volume.
Model (1), (2) and (3) reveal that trader composition is relatively per-
sistent over time. This result is further confirmed by the FIB regression in
Model (5) as well as FIS regression in Model (7), where the coefficients of lag
FIB and lag FIS are both of large magnitudes and statistically significant.
Therefore, investigating the persistence in trader composition is necessary
if we want to study trader composition is determined. I examine several
potential explanations of the persistence in trader composition.
First, we can rule out the possibility of persistence being a mechanical
16Previous studies, for example, Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003), Del Guercio (1996),
and Falkenstein (1996) show that institutions tend to hold liquid stocks.
17See, for example, Gompers and Metrick (2001), Del Guercio (1996) for the relation-
ships between institutional ownership, coverage and index composition.
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relationship introduced by construction. Although institutional ownership is
rather persistent due to its nature of a cumulative measure, the FIT measure
is not necessarily to be persistent. As discussed in Section 2.1, FIT is in the
similar spirit to an incremental measure.
Second, it is possible that the persistence found in the regressions is
caused by some FIT outliers. To address this concern, I sort stocks into
deciles of the one quarter lag FIT and report the average portfolio FIT in
the current quarter. Table 5 Panel A shows that FIT measures are mono-
tonically increasing in the lag FIT levels with a big differences between the
two extreme lag FIT portfolios. For example, FIT of the top historical FIT
decile is 99.39%, much higher than 6.46%, FIT of the bottom historical FIT
decile. The difference is 92.92%, almost twice of the mean FIT. Panel B and
Panel C also present monotonic relationships for FIB and FIS. These results
are inconsistent with the outliers explanation.
Third, window dressing could cause the persistence in trader composition.
Specifically, by ‘window dressing’ institutions dump past losers at quarter
ends, especially at year ends, and buy them back in the next quarter, which
could cause positive correlation between institutional trading volumes across
quarters.18 Since the effect of window dressing is limited to the two adjacent
quarters, I repeat the FIT regressions in Table 4 but replace the first lag of
FIT with the second lag. The results are not reported for brevity, but the
regression results show that persistence in trader composition is robust with
the second lag of FIT, which is inconsistent with the explanation of window
dressing.
Fourth, institutions are known to split their trades over a time period of
18See, for example, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Sias and Starks (1997),
and Ng and Wang (2004) for window dressing.
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up to seven days to reduce trading costs.19 If institutions happen to split
their trades around the turn of a quarter, then institutional trading volumes
of the two adjacent quarters could be positively correlated. However, this ex-
planation is inconsistent with the aforementioned result that the persistence
is robust with the second lag of FIT, because the effect of split of trades is
also limited to two adjacent quarters.
Last, I examine the explanation based on information asymmetry and
find supportive evidence. In particular, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992)
and Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) reveal that in the pres-
ence of information asymmetry, if some investors learn information earlier
than their peers, then even rational investors will focus on some securities
but ignore others with similar characteristics. Therefore, for stocks with in-
formation asymmetry, rational investors, in our case institutional investors,
will concentrate their trading in some stocks but ignore others in a period of
time, therefore lead to persistence in trader composition during in this time
period.
I conduct a test on information asymmetry hypothesis by examining the
persistence across firms with different analyst coverage.20 According to Froot,
Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) and Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman
(1994), we would expect the persistence to be stronger less covered stocks be-
cause they are associated with more information asymmetry. Table 4 Model
(4), (6) and (8) present FIT, FIB and FIS regressions that include the inter-
actions of residual analyst coverage with lag trader composition measures.
19 Chan and Lakonishok (1997) shows that institutions split their trades over a period
as long as seven days. They find little evidence of trade split beyond seven days.
20For this test I employ a residual analyst coverage measure constructed following Grif-
fin and Lemmon (2002) by adjusting a firm’s analyst coverage with the average analyst
coverage of the NYSE size quartile of the firm.
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Consistent with the costly information hypothesis, all the interaction coeffi-
cients are significantly negative, indicating stronger persistence low analyst
coverage stocks.
To summarize, this section shows that that although institutional own-
ership as well as firm characteristics affect trader composition, the most im-
portant determinant of a firm’s trader composition is its historical trader
composition.
1.4 Trader Composition and the Cross-Section of Stock
Returns
1.4.1 Direct Relationship Between Trader Composition and Stocks
Returns
This subsection studies the direct effect of trader composition on stock re-
turns by testing two competing hypotheses. On one hand, according to the
conlcusion by DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a), we would
expect low FIT stocks to earn higher returns than high FIT stocks. Specif-
ically, the theoretical study of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann
(1990a) show that the stocks intensively traded by noise traders earn higher
returns, a phenomenon they called ‘noise trader risk’.
On the other hand, low FIT stocks could earn lower returns because of
the following two aspects of mispricing. First, according to our hypothesis,
mispricing is more intensive in the stocks with lower fractions of institutional
trading volume. Second, although mispricing could take the form of over-
pricing or underpricing, overpricing could be the major form of mispricing.
To arbitrage way overpricing, an investor often needs to sell short a stock
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which could be costly or constrained.21 For example, Almazan, Brown, Carl-
son, and Chapman (2004) report that over 80% of mutual fund managers
are not allowed to short sell. Consistent with overpricing being the major
form of mispricing, previous studies find that abnormal returns of the trading
strategies employing the anomalies such as price momentum, IPO underper-
formance, and the value premium come mainly from the short side, indicating
that overpricing is the source of these anomalies. Given that overpricing is
the predominant form of mispricing, if mispricing is more intensive in low
FIT stocks, then low FIT stocks are overpriced and therefore will earn lower
returns in the next period.
To test the two competing hypotheses, I sort stocks into FIT deciles and
examine monthly returns in the next quarter. I also report Jensen alphas and
Carhart (1997)’s four-factor alphas. In addition to the regression approach,
I also calculate DGTW returns obtained from the benchmark-portfolio pro-
cedure for the FIT deciles.22 In order to control for the time-series correla-
tion of stock returns, I calculate all the t-statistics using Newey-West robust
standard errors. Without otherwise specified, all the t-statistics in the sub-
portfolio analysis are calculated with Newey-West robust standard errors. To
separate the effect of trader composition from institutional ownership, I re-
peat the sub-portfolio analysis with the residual FIT measure. To construct
the residual FIT measure (ResFIT), in each quarter I run an OLS regression
of the FIT measure on institutional ownership at the beginning of the quarter
and then take residuals from the regressions.
Panel A of Table 6 show that, consistent with the overpricing hypothe-
21See, for example, Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002), Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002),
Nagel (2005) and Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) for short sale costs and short sale
constraints.
22I thank Russ Wermers for providing the DGTW benchmark portfolio returns.
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sis, low FIT stocks earn lower returns. In particular, the bottom FIT decile
underperform the top FIT decile by 0.29% to 0.57% per month with differ-
ent return adjustments, and the differences are statistically significant at the
standard levels. In addition, Panel B reports the results with the residual
FIT measure. The return differences are 0.20% to 0.42% per month according
to various return adjustments and significant at the standard levels, indicat-
ing that the result in Panel A is robust after controlling for institutional
ownership.
One interesting question is how the effect of trader composition interact
with stock illiquidity. Institutions generally trade in large size and individ-
uals trade in relatively small size.23 Therefore, institutional trades could
more effectively move the prices of illiquid stocks. As a result, even though
a illiquid stock has low fraction of institutional volume and is mispriced,
the intensity of mispricing is alleviated because for this stock, institutional
trades can move stock prices and improve price efficiency more effectively.
Therefore, for illiquid low FIT stocks, we expect to see less inferior return in
the subsequent period than liquid low FIT stocks. Consequently, we expect
to see the return difference between high FIT and low FIT stocks bigger in
liquid stocks.
To test this hypothesis, I report in Table 7 the monthly stock returns
of the portfolios two dimensionally sorted on lag FIT measure and Amihud
(2002)’s stock illiquidity measure. Consistent with the our hypothesis, the
return difference between low FIT and high FIT stocks is much bigger in
liquid stocks. For example, the returns between the top and bottom FIT
23For example, Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003) finds that institutional trades ac-
count for 86% of large trades but only 22% of small trades for Nasdaq100 stocks. In
their paper, trade sizes of less than 500 shares are designated as small trades and share
increments of greater than 10,000 shares are classified as large trades.
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quintile is 0.69% for the most liquid group but only 0.28% for the most
illiquid group. In addition, this table shows that the difference comes mainly
from the low FIT groups. The returns of the low FIT quintile is 0.67%
for the most liquid group, much lower than that of the low FIT quintile in
most liquid group, 1.17%. This provides further supporting evidence of the
previous hypothesis that low FIT stocks are overpriced and therefore earn
lower subsequent returns.
1.4.2 Trader Composition and Stock Return Momentum
This subsection, as well as the next two subsections, investigates the relation-
ships between trader composition and stock market anomalies. If mispricing
is more intensive in stocks with lower fractions of institutional volumes, then
we would expect stock market anomalies involving mispricing to be more
pronounced in low FIT stocks.
In this subsection I focus on the effect of trader composition on return mo-
mentum. I first examine the profits of 6-month/6-month momentum strategy
across FIT groups. In particular, at the beginning of each month, an inde-
pendent sort is used to rank stocks into three groups of the FIT measure of
the previous quarter, and ten groups of their past six-month returns. Each of
these 30 two-dimensional portfolios are then held for six months.24 In order
to control for the microstructure effects, I skip one month between portfo-
lio formation and return measurement as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
Table 8 Panel A reports the results. Although the momentum profits are sig-
nificant across all FIT groups, the average monthly momentum profit in the
bottom FIT group is 1.48%, much higher than 0.95%, the momentum profits
24The momentum strategy is the same as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
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in the top group. The difference in momentum profits between the top and
the bottom tercile is 0.53%, both economically and statistically significant
(t-stat 3.12). Panel B repeats the test but with the residual FIT measure
which controls for institutional ownership. The result is close to Panel A:
momentum profit of the bottom ResFIT tercile is 0.47% (t-stat 2.93) higher
than that of the top ResFIT tercile.
I adopt quarterly multivariate Fama-Macbeth regressions to further con-
trol for other factors affecting momentum such as size, BE/ME, analyst cov-
erage and turnover.25 The regressions also control for institutional ownership
because of its strong positive relationship with the FIT measure.
Each quarter I run a cross-sectional regression of quarterly cumulative
stock returns on the control variables including the interactions of past six-
month returns with FIT, FIB, and FIS, and then report the time series means
and t-statistics of the coefficients. I also include the interactions of past six-
month returns with institutional ownership, firm size, BE/ME, turnover, and
residual analyst coverage. The regressions also include firm characteristics
such as Beta, size and BE/ME to control for their effects on stock returns.
In order to facilitate the evaluation of economic significance, I follow Chan,
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) to transform all the independent variables
except the S&P500 dummy into standardized ranks between 0 and 1, where 0
represents the minimum and 1 represents the maximum. I also skip a month
before return measurement in order to control for the microstructure effects.
Table 9 reports the regression results, where Model (1) regresses quar-
terly returns on past six-month returns, interaction of past return with lag
25See Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), Daniel and Titman
(1999) and Lee and Swaminthan (2000) for the relationships between return momentum
and firm size, analyst coverage, BE/ME and turnover.
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FIT, and firm characteristics such as Beta, firm size and BE/ME.26 Con-
sistent with the portfolio analysis in Table 8 Panel A, the coefficient of the
FIT interaction is −4.21 (t-stat −4.08), indicating that return momentum
is decreasing in lag FIT. This effect is also economically significant, showing
that after controlling for Beta, size and BE/ME, return momentum is about
2.50% per quarter stronger in the bottom FIT tercile than in the top FIT ter-
cile.27 Model (2) examines interaction between past return and institutional
ownership, which shows that return momentum is also negatively related to
institutional ownership. However, coefficient of IO interaction is only about
60% of the the coefficient of FIT interaction, indicating that effect of institu-
tional ownership on return momentum is much weaker than the effect of FIT.
Next, I put interaction terms of past returns with both FIT and institutional
ownership in Model (3), where the interaction of lag FIT remains almost the
same but the interaction of lag institutional ownership becomes insignificant.
Model (4) further controls for the effect of size, BE/ME, turnover and
residual analyst coverage on return momentum by including their interaction
terms with past returns. There are two apparent results. First, consistent
with previous studies, the interaction terms of size, BE/ME, turnover and
residual analyst coverage show that return momentum is stronger in small
stocks, growth stocks, high turnover stocks and low coverage stocks.28 Sec-
ond, in Model (4) the coefficient of the FIT interaction is reduced to −2.78
from −4.20 in Model (1). This result shows that on one hand, part of the
26Constants are not reported for brevity.
27Return momentum is measured by the difference in quarterly return between the top
and bottom past return deciles, and the 2.50% difference is calculated as 0.66(difference
in standardized lag FIT between top and bottom lag FIT terciles) times 0.9(difference
in standardized past return rank between top and bottom lag past return deciles) times
−4.21, the coefficient of the interaction term.
28See Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), Daniel and Titman
(1999) and Lee and Swaminthan (2000) for the relationships between return momentum
and firm size, BE/ME, analyst coverage and trading volume.
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trader composition effect on return momentum is subsumed by the control
variables; on the other, the remaining effect of trader composition is still
considerably large. For example, in Model (4) the coefficient of FIT interac-
tion, −2.78, suggests that after controlling for other factors in the regression,
return momentum is about 1.65% per quarter stronger in the bottom FIT
tercile than in the top FIT tercile.29
In order to investigate the contributions of FIT’s components to its effect
on return momentum, I include the interactions of past returns with FIB and
FIS in Model (5) to (7). Specifically, Model (5) examines the interactions of
past returns with FIB and FIS; Model (6) further controls for institutional
ownership, and Model (7) controls for the effects of other characteristics
on return momentum. The coefficients of FIS interactions are significant
but the coefficients of FIB interactions are not. For example, in the most
comprehensive model of (7), the FIS interaction is −2.05 (t-stat −2.26) but
the FIB interaction is only −0.94 (t-stat −1.01). These results shows that
the FIS has much stronger effect on momentum than FIB.
To summarize, this subsection presents strong evidence that after con-
trolling for firm characteristics and the effects of the known factors on return
momentum, stocks with lower fractions of institutional trading volumes ex-
hibit significantly stronger return momentum. Further evidence shows frac-
tion of institutional sell volume has much stronger effect on momentum than
does fraction of institutional buy volume.
29Return momentum is measured by the difference in quarterly returns between the top
and bottom past return deciles, and the 1.65% difference is calculated as 0.66(difference
in standardized lag FIT between top and bottom lag FIT terciles) times 0.9 (difference in
standardized past returns between top and bottom past return deciles) times −2.78, the
coefficient of the interaction term.
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1.4.3 Trader Composition and Post Earnings-Announcement Drift
This subsection studies the relationship between trader composition and post
earnings-announcement drift. For this purpose I employ a trading strategy
based on earnings-announcement shock proposed by Frazzini (2005). In par-
ticular, at the beginning of each month, an independent sort is used to rank
stocks into three groups of FIT of previous quarter and ten groups of their
most recent quarterly earnings-announcement shock (will be defined soon).
Each of the 30 two-dimensional portfolios are then held for six months.30
There is a one-month interval between portfolio formation and return mea-
surement in order to control for microstructure effect. This rolling PEAD
strategy is similar to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)’s momentum strategy
except that stocks are sorted on earnings-announcement shocks rather than
past returns.
Quarterly earnings-announcement shocks are measured using the market
model abnormal returns from two days prior to the quarterly announcement
date to one day after the announcement date. The estimation window is the
255 trading days up to the 46th trading day before the earnings announce-
ment. I drop the firms with less than 128 daily returns in the estimation
period to avoid estimation errors. I obtain quarterly earnings-announcement
dates from quarterly CompuStat database and use CRSP value weighted in-
dex as market return. I use stock market reaction rather than earnings sur-
prise to measure earnings-announcement shock because this method avoids
the bias associated with analyst forecast.
Panel A of Table 10 reports performance of PEAD strategy across FIT
30In order to avoid a too long time interval between earnings announcement shock and
return measurement, I drop the firms without an earnings announcement record in the
three-month period prior to portfolio formation.
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groups, which shows that that PEAD is much stronger in low FIT stocks
than in high FIT stocks. Specifically, the average monthly PEAD profit
in the bottom FIT tercile is 0.82%, much higher than that of the top FIT
tercile, 0.32%. The difference in PEAD profit between the two extreme FIT
terciles is 0.50%, both economically and statistically significant (t-stat 4.21).
I then repeat the test with the residual FIT measure and report the results
in Panel B. The PEAD profit is 0.26% (t-stat 2.45) higher in the bottom
ResFIT tercile than in the top ResFIT tercile.
I further examine the effects of trader composition on PEAD in a frame-
work of quarterly multivariate Fama-Macbeth regression. Specifically, in each
quarter I run a cross-sectional regression of quarterly cumulative stock re-
turns on a set of independent variables including the interactions of earnings-
announcement shock with FIT, FIB and FIS. Then the time-series means
and t-statistics of the coefficients are reported. I also include the interaction
of earnings-announcement shock with institutional ownership and firm size
because previous studies have found that PEAD is stronger in low owner-
ship stocks and small stocks.31 Last, I control for Beta, size, BE/ME and
past returns in regressions. Like in the previous subsection, I follow Chan,
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) to transform all the independent vari-
ables into standardized ranks between 0 and 1 to facilitate the evaluation
of economic significance. I also put a one-month interval before the return
measurement to control for the microstructure effects.
Table 11 reports the results of regressions. Model (1) regresses quarterly
stock returns on the past earnings-announcement shocks, its interaction with
lag FIT, and firm characteristics such as Beta, firm size, BE/ME and past
31See Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000) for the relationship between post
earnings-announcement drift, firm size and institutional ownership.
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returns. Consistent with the sub-portfolio analysis in Table 10 Panel A, the
coefficient of this interaction is −2.63 (t-stat −3.80), confirming that PEAD
is stronger in low FIT stocks. This effect is also economically significant,
indicating that PEAD is about 1.56% per quarter stronger in the bottom FIT
tercile than in the top FIT tercile.32 Model (2) examines the interaction of
earnings-announcement shock with institutional ownership, which shows that
PEAD is decreasing institutional ownership, although this effect is slightly
weaker than FIT effect.
I then put the interaction terms of earnings-announcement shock with
both FIT and institutional ownership into Model (3). There are two apparent
results: first, consistent with Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000),
the interaction of ownership is −1.66% (t-stat -2.17), indicating the effect
of institutional ownership is significant; second, although the interaction of
lag FIT is reduced to −1.80% (t-stat -2.43), the FIT effect on PEAD is still
economically and statistically significant. Specifically, this number indicates
that PEAD is about 1.07% per quarter stronger in the bottom FIT tercile
than in the top FIT tercile.33
Model (4) further includes the interaction between firm size and earnings-
announcement shock. We can see in Model (4) that the effect of firm size on
PEAD is rather strong, with the size interaction as big as -3.07 (t-stat 4.17).
32PEAD is measured by the difference in quarterly return between the top and bottom
deciles of earnings-announcement shock deciles, and the difference of 1.56% is calculated
as 0.66(difference in standardized lag FIT between top and bottom lag FIT deciles) times
0.9 (difference in standardized earnings-announcement shocks between top and bottom
deciles of earnings announcement shocks) times −2.63, the coefficient of the interaction
term.
33PEAD is measured by the difference in quarterly return between the top and bot-
tom earnings-announcement shock deciles, and the difference of 1.07% is calculated as
0.33(difference in standardized lag FIT between top and bottom lag FIT terciles) times
0.9 (difference in standardized earnings-announcement shocks between top and bottom
deciles of earnings announcement shocks) times −1.80, the coefficient of the interaction
term.
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In the meantime, the coefficient of FIT interaction is only marginally reduced
to -1.54 from -1.80 in Model (3), remaining significant at the standard level.
In contrast, the interaction of institutional ownership is substantially reduced
to -0.50 from -1.66 in Model (4), becoming insignificant at the standard level.
These results show that after controlling for the effect of firm size on PEAD,
the effect of trader composition on PEAD persists.
Model (5) to (7) further examine the effects of FIB and FIS on PEAD by
including their interactions with earnings announcement shocks. Specifically,
Model (5) examines the interactions of earnings announcement shocks with
FIB and FIS; Model (6) further controls for institutional ownership, and
Model (7) controls for the effects firm size on PEAD. The results shows that
the FIS interactions are significant but the FIB interactions are insignificant.
For example, in the full model of (7), the FIS interaction is −1.45 (t-stat
−1.95) but the FIB interaction is only −0.41 (t-stat −0.46). these results
reveal that the relationship between FIT and momentum comes mainly from
the effect of FIS.
One interesting question is the relationship between trader composition
and earnings-announcement returns. Information revealing is one of the two
channels through which trading composition affects price efficiency. If in-
stitutions act as rational traders, then their trades could reveal information
and improve information transparency. As a result, we would expect that
for stocks with higher fraction of institutional trading volume, there is less
‘surprise’ in stock returns around an information event such as earnings an-
nouncement. Therefore a testable hypothesis is that high FIT stocks will
have less extreme earnings-announcement returns than low FIT stocks.
To test this hypothesis, I calculate the four-day market model adjusted
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abnormal returns around quarterly earnings announcements for the sample
firms. Then for each month, I sort firms with quarterly earnings-announcements
in that month into deciles of one-quarter lag FIT. I then pool the earnings-
announcement returns for each FIT decile, fit these returns into normal dis-
tribution, and plot the distributions across the FIT deciles. Figure 1 plots
the distributions of the earnings-announcement returns for the bottom FIT
decile, the 4th FIT decile, the 7th FIT decile, and the top FIT decile. Figure 1
shows a very clear monotonic pattern that as FIT decreases, there are more
extreme earnings-announcement returns as indicated by fatter tails of the
distributions. This result is consistent with my hypothesis that higher frac-
tion of institutional trading volume leads to more information transparency
and therefore more price efficiency.
To summarize, this subsection presents strong empirical evidence that
after controlling for price factors and the effect of institutional ownership and
firm size on PEAD, the stocks with lower fractions of institutional volumes
exhibit significantly larger PEAD. Further evidence show that fraction of
institutional sell volume has stronger effect on PEAD than does fraction of
institutional buy volume.
1.4.4 Trader Composition and The Value Premium
This subsection studies the relationship between trader composition and the
value premium. I start with sub-portfolio analysis where at the beginning of
each month, an independent sort is used to rank stocks into three groups of
one quarter lag FIT and ten groups of their book-to-market ratios. I calculate
monthly returns of the 30 two dimensional portfolios, and then report the
time series means and t-statistics of the monthly portfolio returns.
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Panel A of Table 12 reports the value premiums across the FIT groups,
which reveals that the value premium is much bigger in the stocks with lower
FIT. For example, the monthly value premium in the bottom FIT tercile is
0.90%, much higher than 0.27%, the value premium in the top tercile. The
difference in the value premium between the top and the bottom terciles is
0.63%, both economically and statistically significant (t-stat 3.09). Panel B
shows that the difference in the value premium is 0.41 (t-stat 2.07) higher
in the bottom ResFIT tercile than the top ResFIT tercile. Panel C and
D further examine the value premiums across FIB and FIS groups. The
difference in the value premiums between the top and bottom terciles is
0.53% (t-stat 2.70) for FIB and 0.65% (t-stat 3.23) for FIS. To summarize,
this table presents strong evidence that the value premium is bigger in stocks
with lower fraction of institutional trading volume.
Similar to the previous two subsections, I further investigate the re-
sults obtained from sub-portfolio analysis in a framework of monthly Fama-
Macbeth regressions. Specifically, each month I run a cross-sectional regres-
sion of monthly stock returns on a set of independent variables including the
interactions of BE/ME with FIT, FIB and FIS. I then report the time-series
means and t-statistics of the coefficients. I also interact BE/ME with insti-
tutional ownership and firm size because previous studies have found that
the value premium is stronger in low ownership stocks and small stocks.34
Last, I add firm characteristics such as beta, firm size, and past returns to
control for their effects on stock returns. In order to facilitate the evaluation
of economic significance, I follow Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996)
to transform all the independent variables into standardized ranks between
34See Fama and French (1992) and Nagel (2005) for the relationship between the value
premium and firm size and institutional ownership.
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0 and 1.
Table 13 reports the regression results. Model (1) regresses returns on
BE/ME, its interaction with lag FIT, and price factors such as beta, firm
size, and momentum. The coefficient of the FIT interaction is −0.79 (t-
stat −3.02), confirming that the value premium is bigger in low FIT stocks.
This effect is also economically significant, indicating that after controlling
for price factors, the value premium is about 0.47% per month stronger in
the bottom FIT tercile than in the top FIT tercile.35 I then examine the
interaction between BE/ME and institutional ownership in Model (2), which
shows that consistent with Nagel (2005), the magnitude of value premium is
decreasing in institutional ownership. Model (3) further put the interaction
terms of BE/ME with both institutional ownership and FIT together. The
interaction of FIT is −0.56% (t-stat -1.89), indicating that after controlling
for the effect of institutional ownership, the value premium is 0.33% stronger
the bottom FIT tercile than in the top FIT tercile.36
Model (4) further controls for the effect of firm size on the value premium
by including its interaction term with BE/ME, where the effect of historical
FIT on value premium is about the same as in Model (5), suggesting that the
effect of FIT on value premium is robust to the control of the effect of firm
size on the value premium. In the meantime, the interaction of firm size is not
significant at the standard level, probably because my sample excludes the
35The value premium is measured by the difference in monthly return between the top
and bottom BE/ME deciles, and the difference of 0.47% is calculated as 0.66 (difference
in standardized lag FIT between top and bottom lag FIT terciles) times 0.9 (difference
in standardized past returns between top and bottom BE/ME deciles) times −0.79, the
coefficient of the interaction term.
36The value premium is measured by the difference in monthly return between the top
and bottom BE/ME deciles, and the difference of 0.33% is calculated as 0.66 (difference
in standardized lag FIT between top and bottom lag FIT terciles) times 0.9 (difference
in standardized past returns between top and bottom BE/ME deciles) times −0.56, the
coefficient of the interaction term.
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small stocks with market capitalizations below NYSE 10% cutoff or prices
below $5.
Model (5) to (7) further examine the effects of FIB and FIS on the value
premium by interacting BE/ME with FIB and FIS. Model (5) examines the
interactions of BE/ME with FIB and FIS; Model (6) further controls for
institutional ownership, and Model (7) controls for the effects firm size on
the value premium. The results show that the FIS interactions are significant
but the FIB interactions are insignificant. For example, in the full model of
(7), the FIS interaction is −0.45 (t-stat −1.69) but the FIB interaction is
−0.36 (t-stat −1.21). these results suggest that the effect of FIS on the value
premium is stronger than the effect of FIB.
I also conduct sub-period analysis by splitting the sample period into
three sub-periods: 1980-1987, 1988-1996, 1997-2005, each of these sub-periods
containing eight or nine years. Next, I repeat the tests for the three sub-
periods. To summarize, the sub-sample results are similar to full-sample
results. An exception is that the effect of trader composition on the value
premium does not hold for the sub-period of 1988-1996. For brevity, I list
some major sub-sample results in Table 14 which presents the effect of trader
composition on momentum), Table 15 which presents the effect of trader
composition on PEAD), and Table 16 which presents the effect of trader
composition on the value premium.
While Table 14 and Table 15 verify the effects of trading composition
on momentum and PEAD in the sub-periods, Table 16 shows that the dif-
ferences in the value premium between the top and bottom FIT tercile are
significant for the sub-periods of 1980-1987 and 1997-2005 but insignificant
for the sub-period of 1988-1996, which is 0.08% per month (t-stat 0.27). This
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inconsistency is caused by the fact the the overall value premium is weaker
for my sample in the sub-period of 1988-1996. For example, the value pre-
mium is 0.36% (t-stat 1.22), 0.26% (t-stat 0.65) and 0.28% (t-stat 1.04) for
the three FIT terciles respectively. Therefore the average poor performance
of the value strategy leads to the indistinguishable cross-sectional difference
between FIT terciles during this period. However, the effect of FIT on the
value premium exists for the two other sub-periods where the value strategy
does perform. To summarize, the sub-sample analysis of the value premium
result is supportive to my hypothesis that the more severe pricing errors in
the low FIT group leads to the stronger value premium in these stocks.
To summarize, this subsection presents strong empirical evidence that
stocks with lower fractions of institutional volumes exhibit significantly larger
value premium. Further evidence indicates that fraction of institutional sell
volume has stronger effect on the value premium than does fraction of in-
stitutional buy volume. In addition, the stronger value premium in stocks
dominated by individual traders is supportive of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1994), Daniel and Titman (1997) and Griffin and Lemmon (2002)
which suggest that the value premium is associated with mispricing rather
than risk.
In this chapter, I present significant relationships between trader compo-
sition and the cross-section of stock returns. Specifically, stocks with lower
fractions of institutional volumes underperform stocks with higher fractions
of institutional volumes, and this underperformance is more pronounced in
liquid stocks. Moreover, stocks with lower fractions of institutional volumes
exhibit stronger stock market anomalies such as return momentum, post
earnings-announcement drift, and the value premium. Further analysis show
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that the aforementioned relationships comes mainly from the effect of insti-
tutional sell volumes.
Therefore this chapter presents evidence that institutional trading gen-
erally improves stock price efficiency. However, does it indicate that insti-
tutions improve price efficiency in every scenario? To address this question,
the next chapter will analyze the effect of positive-feedback trading by insti-
tutions on stock return momentum and stock price efficiency.
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2 Does Positive-Feedback Trading by Insti-
tutions Contribute to Momentum?
2.1 Measuring Positive-Feedback Trading by Institu-
tions
Positive-feedback trading, or momentum trading, is simply the trading strat-
egy of buying past winners and/or selling past losers. Such trading might
be fostered by the incentive for institutions to ‘window dress’ or herd. In-
stitutional preference or the belief that trends are likely to continue can also
induce institutional positive-feedback trading.37
Although several previous studies suggest that institutions are positive-
feedback traders, other studies find little evidence of positive-feedback trad-
ing by institutions.38 These studies make different conclusions, yet they
all treat stocks as a homogeneous group in terms of the intensity of insti-
tutional positive-feedback trading. However, the intensities of institutional
positive-feedback trading could be vastly different across individual stocks.
For example, if during a time period institutions, on one hand, buy stock i
when its price rises and sell stock i when its price falls and, on the other, sell
stock j when its price rises and buy stock j when its price falls, then insti-
tutions act as positive-feedback traders to stock i but contrarian traders to
stock j. Consistent with the existence of heterogeneity in positive-feedback
37See Andreassen and Kraus (1990), Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991),
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003), and Sias (2004)
for the possible reasons of institutional positive-feedback trading.
38See Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995),
Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003), and Griffin, Harris, and
Topaloglu (2003) for supportive evidence of institutional positive-feedback trading. Also
see Falkenstein (1996), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), and Gompers and Metrick (2001)
for counter-evidence.
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trading among individual stocks, Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2002)
observe that institutions buy past winners with positive cash flow news but
sell past winners without cash flow news, while Badrinath and Wahal (2002)
find that institutions are positive-feedback traders when they initiate a long
position but are not positive-feedback traders when they change a current
position or terminate a position.
In order to address the heterogeneity of institutional positive-feedback
trading among individual stocks, I construct a measure, MT (momentum
trading), which aims at evaluating the intensity of positive-feedback trading
by institutions to individual stocks. The MT measure is updated every
quarter on a two-year rolling basis; that is, I calculate the MT measure for
a stock with the stock’s returns and quarterly institutional holdings during
the two-year estimation period, and then apply the obtained MT measure to
the subsequent quarter. For example, I calculate MT using the holdings and
returns from the first quarter of 1980 to the last quarter of 1981, and then
apply this MT to January, February and March of 1982.
The rolling-window estimation avoids the endogeneity problem. In addi-
tion, I choose a two-year rolling window out of two concerns: first, a longer
window might be inappropriate because the pattern of institutional positive-
feedback trading might change over a long time period; second, a shorter
window might be inappropriate as well, because I want to examine insti-
tutional trading patterns based on a long enough sequence of trades. The
empirical results are similar, however, when I choose one-year or three-year
rolling windows as a robustness check.










Where 4holdit is the change of aggregate institutional share holdings of
stock i over quarter t divided by stock i ’s total shares outstanding; ppindexit
is a discrete index of past performance of stock i , which varies from −5 to 5
and ranks stock i ’s performance in the six-month period up to the beginning
of quarter t.
In particular, the MT measure is calculated with the following four steps
as illustrated in Figure 1:
Step One: As shown in Figure 1 Panel A, for all the eight quarters of
the two-year estimation window, I calculate 4holdit for quarter t. 4holdit is
positive if institutions in aggregate buy stock i during quarter t and negative
if they, in aggregate, sell stock i during quarter t. Next, I sum up the absolute
values of all eight 4holdit . The sum, ∑8t=1 |4holdit|, represents the total
absolute institutional trading of stock i during the estimation period.
Step Two: As shown in Figure 1 Panel B, for quarter t in the estimation
period, I divide the quarterly institutional trading4holdit by ∑8t=1 |4holdit|,




, their absolute values adding up to 1 across the eight
quarters, are positive (negative) when institutions in aggregate buy (sell)
stock i during quarter t. In addition, this ratio takes a high absolute value
if institutions, in aggregate, trade stock i in large volume during quarter t
relative to the other quarters of the estimation period.
Step Three: As shown in Figure 1 Panel B, I then calculate for each
quarter t the ppindexit, a discrete index measuring the past performance of
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stock i. In particular, at the beginning of quarter t, stocks are sorted into 10
portfolios according to their past six-month returns. Then stock i is assigned
a discrete ppindexit between −5 to 5 based on its past return portfolio as
shown in Table 17. ppindexit is positive for past winners and negative for
past losers.
Step Four: Following equation (1), for each quarter t, I multiply 4holdit∑8
t=1
|4holdit|




ppindexit. This product is positive for
quarter t when institutions in quarter t buy a past winner or sell a past loser.
On the contrary, this product is negative for quarter t if institutions in quar-
ter t buy a past loser or sell a past winner. Moreover, the product takes a big
value if in this quarter institutions trade an extreme winner or extreme loser
in large volumes. I then sum up the product across each quarter to obtain
the MT measure for stock i. Based on this construction the MT measure,
ranging between −5 and 5, is higher for stock i if during the estimation
period institutions more often buy (sell) it when it is a past winner (loser).
To further understand the MT measure, consider two extreme examples.
Suppose institutions are positive-feedback traders to stock i and contrar-
ian traders to stock j. Suppose further that institutions trade both stocks
twice during the two-year estimation period, buying stock i in quarter 3
when it is an extreme past winner (ppindexi3 equals 5) and selling stock i
in quarter 7 when it is an extreme past loser (ppindexi7 equals −5). Con-
versely, institutions buy stock j in quarter 2 when it is an extreme past loser
(ppindexj2 equals −5) and sell stock j in quarter 4 when it is an extreme




ppindexit are positive for quarter 3 and 7 but zero for the rest





up to 1, the two products sum up to 5. That is, MTi equals 5, reflecting




ppindexjt are negative for quarter 2 and 4 but zero for the rest




to 1, the two products sum up to -5, reflecting strong contrarian trading.
The MT measure distinguishes individual stocks according to how much
institutional positive-feedback trading they experience. Therefore I can di-
rectly examine the impact of institutional positive-feedback trading on return
momentum by comparing the profits of momentum trading strategy across
MT levels. The MT measure also makes it possible for us to directly inves-
tigate the relationships between the effects of institutional positive-feedback
trading and the effects of other factors on return momentum by calculating
momentum profits for portfolios that are two dimensionally sorted on MT
and other factors.
2.2 The Effect of Positive-Feedback Trading by Insti-
tutions on Return Momentum
2.2.1 The MT Measure and Firm Characteristics
I estimate the MT measure as described in Section 2.1 and report the sum-
mary statistics. Table 18 provides a snapshot of one quarter in every three
years together with the summary statistics of the whole sample period. Al-
though 13f institutional holding data start from the first quarter of 1980,
the MT measure is available from the first quarter of 1982 because of the
two-year rolling estimation method.
My sample contains 367, 337 firm-quarter observations with available MT
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measures. The sample size increases from 2, 552 firms in the first quarter of
1982, to 4, 499 firms in the first quarter of 2003, reflecting the rapid growth of
institutional trading over the past two decades. The average MT measures
of the whole sample period and every quarters in Table 18 are significantly
positive. An unreported result shows that the average MT measures are
significantly positive at the 0.01 level for all of the 96 quarters during the
1982-2005 sample period, which indicates that institutions in aggregate are
positive-feedback traders. However, although the mean MT measure is sta-
tistically significant, the economic significance is much weaker as the means
and the medians of MT in all 96 quarters of the sample period are below 1.
This result indicates that although institutions are positive-feedback traders,
the average intensity of their positive-feedback trading behavior is rather
weak. On average, the intensity of institutional positive-feedback trading
during 1982-2005 is comparable to a strategy of buying (selling) the past
winner (loser) stocks whose past returns are only slightly above (below) the
median past stock returns but still within the middle past return quintile.
Although the summary statistics of MT are persistent over time, there
are significant cross-sectional variations in MT during the sample period. For
example, in the first quarter of 1982, the mean MT is 0.31 with a standard
deviation of 2.16. The cutoff points also suggest significant cross-sectional
dispersions: the 10% cutoff is −2.62; the 25% cutoff is −1.27; the 75% cut-
off is 1.87 and the 90% cutoff is 3.52. These results suggest that different
stocks are indeed subject to different amounts of positive-feedback trading
by institutions.
One interesting question is how institutional positive-feedback trading
is related to firm characteristics. For example, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and
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Vishny (1992) observe stronger positive-feedback trading by pension funds
in small stocks. In addition, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) find
that positive-feedback trading by mutual funds is stronger on the buy side
than on the sell side, implying that winner stocks experiences more positive-
feedback trading than does losers.
In order to examine the relationships between institutional positive-feedback
trading and firm characteristics, I calculate for each month the average
firm characteristics of MT quintiles and report in table 19 the time-series
means and t-statistics of the cross-sectional averages. The firm characteris-
tics include monthly stock return, size, the book-to-market ratio (henceforth
BE/ME), turnover, analyst coverage, return volatility, and firm age. I ex-
amine these firm characteristics because they are documented to affect stock
return momentum. Firm size is the natural log of a firm’s market capital-
ization. BE/ME is the summation of book equity and deferred tax of a
firm divided by its market equity. I apply BE/ME calculated at the fiscal
year end of year t to the one-year period starting from July of year t + 1.
Turnover is the monthly trading volume divided by total shares outstand-
ing. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts providing a firm’s one year
earnings forecasts. Because trading volumes of NASDAQ stocks are inflated
relative to those of NYSE/AMEX stocks, I follow Chen, Hong, and Stein
(2002) to demean the turnovers with the cross sectional averages of NAS-
DAQ or NYSE/AMEX turnovers according to the stock market in which the
firms are listed.39 I also follow Griffin and Lemmon (2002) to adjust a firm’s
analyst coverage by the average coverage of the NYSE size quartile that the
firm belongs to.40 I calculate return volatility and firm age following Jiang,
39Unless otherwise specified, all the turnovers in this paper are demeaned turnovers.
40Unless otherwise specified, all the analyst coverages in this paper are residual analyst
coverages. My results are not changed when I use another size-adjusted analyst coverage
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Lee, and Zhang (2005) and Zhang (2006). In particular, for month t, return
volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns of 25 trading days
up to the end of month t-1. Age of a firm is the number of months from the
firm’s first CRSP monthly return record.
Table 19 presents three results on the relationships between institutional
positive-feedback trading and firm characteristics:
First, consistent with Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), high MT
stocks are relatively small in size. The average firm size of the top MT quin-
tile is 19.96, lower than those of the middle three quintiles. In the meantime,
low MT stocks are also relatively small in size, with an average firm size
of 19.78. Second, there is no discernable difference in the levels of institu-
tional positive-feedback trading between winner stocks and loser stocks. For
example, the average monthly returns of the top MT quintile is 1.01%, not
significantly different from 1.17%, the average returns of the bottom MT
quintile. One possible reason of the difference between my finding and Grin-
blatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) is that my sample includes all institutions
while their samples include only mutual funds. Third, the strength of insti-
tutional positive-feedback trading is related to turnover, BE/ME, analyst
coverage, return volatility and firm age. Table 19 shows that institutional
positive-feedback trading level increases in turnover and return volatility and
decreases in BE/ME, coverage and firm age. The differences in turnover,
BE/ME, analyst coverage, return volatility and firm age between the top
and the bottom MT quintiles are 0.12, 0.05, −0.79, 0.004 and −53, all sta-
tistically significantly at the standard level.
measure suggested by Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000).
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2.2.2 Institutional Positive-Feedback Trading and Return Momen-
tum
This subsection examines the effect of institutional positive-feedback trading
on stock return momentum. I independently sort stocks into three groups
of MT and ten groups of past performance and then calculate, for each
MT groups, the momentum profits of the six-month formation/six-month
holding strategy following Jegadeesh and Titman (2001).41 In particular, at
the beginning of every month, I form two-dimensional portfolios on the MT
measures and the past six-month cumulative stock returns and hold these
portfolios for six months.
The result is reported in Table 20 Panel A, which shows that momentum
profits increase in the MT measures, ranging from 1.08% (t-stat 2.95) for
the bottom MT tercile to 1.61% (t-stat 4.72) for the top MT tercile. The
difference in momentum profits between the top and the bottom MT terciles
is 0.53% (t-stat 3.21), significant at the 0.01 level. The difference is not only
statistically significant but economically significant as well, compounding to
an annual return difference of 8.58%.
For a robustness check, I further report in Panel B the results of Fama-
French three-factor regressions of momentum profits. The difference in the
three-factor alphas between the top and bottom MT terciles is 0.48% (t-stat
3.02), close to the difference in momentum profits reported in Panel A. To
summarize, Table 20 presents strong empirical evidence that institutional
positive-feedback trading contributes to stock return momentum.
41I also repeat the tests in this paper with an alternative momentum strategy that skips
a month between formation and holding period. The results are not changed with the
skip-a-month momentum strategy.
53
Trading cost is always a concern when we evaluate the profitability of
a trading strategy. If, for example, employing momentum strategy to high
MT stocks is associated with much higher transaction costs than to low MT
stocks, then the difference in transaction costs could offset the difference in
momentum profits. Although the data of transaction costs are not directly
available, we could evaluate the transaction costs based on firm characteris-
tics across MT levels. Specifically, if we consider size and turnover as proxies
for liquidity and hence trading cost, then the trading costs of applying mo-
mentum strategies to high MT stocks should be no higher than that of low
MT stocks because as shown in Table 19, high MT stocks are only slightly
smaller in firm size but much higher in turnover than low MT stocks.
2.2.3 Robustness Check with Firm Size, BE/ME and Turnover
Three most important firm characteristics, size, BE/ME and turnover, have
been documented to have considerable impact on return momentum. For
example, Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) ob-
serve stronger return momentum in small stocks than in large stocks. Daniel
and Titman (1999) shows that return momentum is stronger in low BE/ME
stocks than in high BE/ME stocks. Lee and Swaminthan (2000) find that
return momentum is more prevalent for the stocks with higher turnover.
This subsection is intended to check whether the effect of institutional
positive-feedback trading on return momentum is robust after controlling for
size, BE/ME and turnover. In addition, it is also interesting to understand
the relationships between the effect of institutional positive-feedback trading
and those of size, BE/ME or turnover on return momentum.
I conduct the tests in this regard by calculating the profits of the six-
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month formation and six-month holding momentum strategy for stock port-
folios two-dimensionally sorted on the MT measure and size, or BE/ME, or
turnover. In particular, at the beginning of month t, I independently sort
stocks into three groups of MT , three groups of size, BE/ME or turnover,
and five groups of past six-month cumulative returns.42 Then all these three-
dimensional portfolios are held for six months. This momentum strategy is
the same as in Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) except that I form five groups
of past returns instead of ten groups in order to ensure enough number of
stocks in each three-dimensional portfolio.
Panel A of Table 21 reports average monthly returns of the three-dimensional
portfolios sorted on size, MT and past return, while Panel B provide a com-
parison of the momentum profits (W-L) for the three by three size-MT
groups. Within all three size groups, momentum profits are increasing in
the MT measure. Specifically, the differences in monthly momentum profits
between high and low MT stocks are 0.45% (t-stat 2.73), 0.38% (t-stat 2.38)
and 0.44% (t-stat 2.22), all statistically significant at the standard levels. To
summarize, Table 21 shows that the effect of institutional positive-feedback
trading on return momentum persists after controlling for firm size.
One might attribute the result in Table 21 to the variation of size within
each size group. To address this concern, I report the average decile ranks
of size and MT for each size-MT group in Table 21 Panel A. In particular,
I first assign decile ranks of size and MT to the stocks in each cross-section,
where 1 is assigned to the bottom decile and 10 to the top decile. Next, I
calculate the time series-averages of the cross sectional means of size and MT
42Size is measured at the end of month t-1. I match BE/ME at the fiscal year end of
year t-1 to the one-year period starting from July of year t+1. Turnover is the demeaned
turnover of month t-1.
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ranks for each size-MT group. As shown in Panel A, within each size group
the size-MT groups are almost undistinguishable in size but vastly different
in MT , indicating that the difference in momentum profits between the high
and low MT group is driven by the variation in MT rather than firm size.
In addition, Panel B shows that the effect of firm size on stock return
momentum is also robust after controlling for institutional positive-feedback
trading. For example, the differences in monthly profits between large and
small stocks across MT groups are 0.62% (t-stat 3.60), 0.35% (t-stat 1.89)
and 0.63% (t-stat 2.99), all statistically significant at the standard levels.
These results indicate that the effects of firm size and institutional positive-
feedback trading on return momentum are independent of each other.
Similarly, Table 22 examine the effect of institutional positive-feedback
trading on stock return momentum after controlling for BE/ME. Panel A
reports and Panel B compares the momentum profits across the MT-BM
groups. We can see in Panel B that within two of the three BE/ME groups,
the differences in momentum profits between high and low MT stocks are
economically and statistically significant. In particular, the differences in
monthly momentum profits between high and low MT stocks are 0.74% (t-
stat 4.00), 0.23% (t-stat 1.28) and 0.41% (t-stat 2.02). Although one of the
difference 0.23% is not statistically significant, the other difference 0.74% is
not only statistically significant at the 0.01 level but also much higher than
0.53%, the average effect of MT as shown in Table 20. Therefore, the results
of Table 22 verify that the effect of institutional positive-feedback trading is
robust to the control of BE/ME.
In order to address the concern that the result might be due to the varia-
tion of BE/ME within each BE/ME group, I also calculate the average decile
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ranks of BE/ME and MT for each BM-MT portfolio. Specifically, I first as-
sign decile ranks of BE/ME and MT to the stocks in each cross-section,
where 1 is assigned to the bottom decile and 10 to the top decile. Next, I
calculate the time series averages of the cross sectional means of the ranks.
Panel A shows that within each BE/ME group, there is no discernable dif-
ference in BE/ME but vast difference in MT between the BM-MT groups,
indicating that the differences in momentum profits between high and low
MT groups are caused by the variation of institutional momentum trading
rather than BE/ME.
In addition, Table 22 Panel B shows that the effect of BE/ME on stock
return momentum is also robust after controlling for institutional positive-
feedback trading. For example, the differences in monthly momentum profits
between the low BE/ME and the high BE/ME stocks for the three MT
groups are 0.19% (t-stat 0.93), 0.54% (t-stat 2.54) and 0.51% (t-stat 2.22),
respectively.
Last, Table 23 presents the robustness check which controls of turnover.
Panel A reports the average monthly returns of each three-dimensional port-
folios sorted on turnover, MT , and past return, while Panel B presents the
momentum profits across turnover-MT groups. We can see that within all
three turnover groups, momentum profits are increasing with MT level and
the differences in momentum profits between high and low MT stocks are
statistically significant two out of the three turnover groups. In particu-
lar, the differences in monthly momentum profits between high and low MT
stocks are 0.12% (t-stat 0.78), 0.32% (t-stat 2.38) and 0.59% (t-stat 3.57).
To summarize, Table 23 shows that the contribution of institutional positive-
feedback trading to stock return momentum persists after controlling for
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turnover.
I also report in Panel A the average decile ranks of turnover and MT for
each turnover-MT portfolio, which show that within each turnover group,
the turnover-MT groups are almost undistinguishable in turnover but vastly
different in MT . This result indicates that the difference in momentum
profits between high and low MT groups is driven by institutional positive-
feedback trading rather than turnover. Panel B shows the coexistence of
the effects of turnover and institutional positive-feedback trading on stock
return momentum. For example, the difference in monthly profits between
high turnover and low turnover stocks are 0.31% (t-stat 1.64), 0.51% (t-
stat 2.85) and 0.77% (t-stat 3.87), all statistically significant at the standard
levels.
2.2.4 Robustness Check With The Residual MT Measures
One might argue that the sub-portfolio analysis based on three-dimensional
sorts in Table 21 to Table 23 is incomplete in the sense that they control for
size, BE/ME and turnover separately, and that the effect of the MT measure
could be altered if these factors are controlled simultaneously. An ideal test
to address this concern is to sort stocks independently on size, BE/ME,
turnover, and MT, and then examine momentum profits across this multi-
dimensionally sorted portfolios. However, this method will require a huge
sample size. For example, if in each cross-section we sort stocks into three
groups based on each of the aforementioned four variables and five groups
based on past returns, in total 405 sub-portfolios will be generated, leaving
very few or even no stocks in some portfolios given the current sample size.
In order to control for size, BE/ME and turnover simultaneously, I create
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a residual MT measure, ResMT1. The methodology is similar to Hong,
Lim, and Stein (2000) in a different context. Specifically, in each month t of
the sample period, I estimate a cross-sectional regression of the MT measure
on firm size, BE/ME, and demeaned turnover of month t-1. I then take
the residuals from these regressions as the ResMT1 measures, which is the
component of MT measures that is orthogonal to size, BE/ME and turnover.
Next, I repeat the test of Table 20 but with the ResMT1 measure rather
than the original MT measure. In particular, at the beginning of every
month, I form three by ten two-dimensional portfolios independently on the
ResMT1 measures and the past six-month cumulative stock returns and hold
these portfolios for six months.
The result is reported in Table 24 Panel A, which shows that momentum
profits increase in the ResMT1 measures, ranging from 0.93% (t-stat 2.42)
for the bottom ResMT1 tercile to 1.50% (t-stat 4.17) for the top ResMT1
tercile. The difference in momentum profits between the top and the bottom
ResMT1 terciles is 0.57% (t-stat 3.24), significant at the 0.01 level. Panel B
further report the Fama-French three-factor alphas for momentum profits of
the three ResMT1 groups. The difference in the three-factor alphas between
the top and bottom ResMT1 terciles is 0.48% (t-stat 2.87). To summarize,
Table 24 shows that the effect the MT measure on return momentum is
robust when we control for size, BE/ME and turnover simultaneously.
Besides size, BE/ME and turnover, three other firm characteristics were
also found to affect return momentum. Specifically, Hong, Lim, and Stein
(2000) shows that return momentum is stronger in stocks with lower analyst
coverage. Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) and Zhang (2006) document stronger
momentum in firms with higher return volatility and shorter history. In order
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to further control for analyst coverage, return volatility and firm age, I create
a second residual MT measure, ResMT2. In particular, in each month t of
the sample period, I estimate a cross sectional regression of the MT measure
on firm size, BE/ME, demeaned turnover, residual analyst coverage of month
t-1, return volatility in the 25 trading days up to the end of month t-1, and
firm age of month t-1.43 The ResMT2 measures are the residuals from these
regressions.
Next, I repeat the test in Table 24 with the ResMT2 measure rather than
the ResMT1 measure. In particular, I form three by ten two-dimensional
portfolios independently on the ResMT2 measures and the past six-month
cumulative stock returns and hold these portfolios for six months. Table 25
Panel A shows that momentum profits increase in the ResMT2 measures,
ranging from 0.96% (t-stat 2.52) for the bottom ResMT2 tercile to 1.45% (t-
stat 4.02) for the top ResMT2 tercile. The difference in momentum profits
between the top and the bottom ResMT2 quintile is 0.49% (t-stat 2.89),
significant at the 0.01 level. Panel B further shows that the difference in the
three-factor alphas between the top and bottom ResMT2 terciles is 0.42%
(t-stat 2.52). These results suggest that the effect of the MT measure persists
after further controlling for analyst coverage, return volatility and firm age.
2.2.5 Robustness Check with An Alternative Measure of Positive-
Feedback Trading
In this subsection I further examine the robustness of the effect of institu-
tional positive-feedback trading with an alternative positive-feedback trading
measure. In particular, in equation (1) that describes the estimation of the
43The estimation of return volatility and firm age is the same as in Jiang, Lee, and
Zhang (2005), and Zhang (2005).
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MT measure, I adjusted quarterly institutional trading, 4holdit, by total
institutional trading during the estimation period,
∑8
t=1 |4holdit|. Since the
adjusted quarterly institutional trading 4holdit∑8
t=1
|4holdit|
add up to 1 across the
eight quarters during estimation period, MT measure ranges between -5 and
5. This nice property of the MT measure enable us to easily assess the
intensity of institutional positive-feedback trading by the value of the MT
measure. For example, a MT measure of 4 indicates that the intensity of
institutional positive-feedback trading is comparable to a strategy of buy-
ing past winners in the second highest past return decile (ppindex equals 4)
and/or sell past losers in the second lowest past return decile (ppindex equals
-4).
While the aforementioned adjustment of total institutional trading make
the MT measure easily interpreted, it results in a disadvantage that the MT
measure does not capture the magnitude of total institutional trading. For
example, suppose institutions are positive-feedback traders to both stock i
and stock j. Suppose further that institutions trade both stocks twice during
the two-year estimation period. In particular, they buy 1% of stock i’s total
shares outstanding in quarter 3 when it is an extreme past winner (ppindexi3
equals 5) and sell 1% of stock i in quarter 7 when it is an extreme past loser
(ppindexi7 equals −5). In addition, institutions buy 2% of stock j’s shares in
quarter 3 when it is an extreme past winner and sell 2% of stock j in quarter




ppindexit are 2.5 (0.5 times 5) for quarter 3 and 7 but zero for




ppindexjt are also 2.5 (0.5 times 5) for quarter 3
and 7 but zero for the rest of the quarters, leading to a MT measure of 5 for
stock j. Although the MT measures of stock i and j are both 5, institutional
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positive-feedback trading could have stronger impact on stock j than stock
i because institutions trade stock j in bigger volume than they trade stock
i. In order to address this concern, I construct an alternative measure of
institutional positive-feedback trading, the MTWO measure (MT measure




(4holdit × ppindexit) (6)
The MTWO measure is constructed with the same method as the MT
measure except that I do not adjust quarterly institutional trading, 4holdit,
with total institutional trading during the estimation period,
∑8
t=1 |4holdit|.
As a result, the MTWO measures captures the magnitudes of institutional
trading.
I calculated the MTWO measure following equation (2) and examine
its correlation with the MT measure. The Spearman rank correlation is as
high as 0.87, indicating that the MTWO measure and the MT measure are
strongly correlated. Next, I repeat the test in Table 20 but with the MTWO
measure rather than the original MT measure. The result is reported in
Table 26 Panel A, where momentum profits increase from 1.06% per month
(t-stat 2.93) for the bottom MTWO tercile to 1.55% per month (t-stat 4.57)
for the top MTWO tercile. The difference in momentum profits between the
top and the bottom MTWO terciles is 0.49% (t-stat 2.94), significant at the
0.01 level. Panel B further report the Fama-French three-factor alphas for
momentum profits of the three MTWO groups. The difference in the three-
factor alphas between the top and bottom ResMT1 terciles is 0.45% (t-stat
2.76). To summarize, Table 26 shows that the effect institutional positive-
feedback trading on return momentum is robust with the alternative measure
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that considers the magnitudes of institutional trading.
2.3 Institutional Positive-Feedback Trading and Stock
Price Efficiency
This section aims at investigating the effect of institutional positive-feedback
trading on stock price efficiency. Theoretically it is not clear whether or not
institutional positive-feedback trading improves the market efficiency. On
one hand, institutional positive-feedback trading could improve market effi-
ciency if it speeds up the correction of stock mispricing. Specifically, if market
underreact to positive (negative) news and thus underprice (overprice) the
past winners (losers), then institutional positive-feedback trading can speed
up the price adjustment process by pushing the winners (losers) further to
the ‘correct’ level. On the other hand, institutional positive-feedback trad-
ing could deteriorate market efficiency by driving stock prices further away
from their fundamentals if such trading is unrelated to information on firm
fundamentals or is induced by overreaction.
2.3.1 Evidence from Earnings Revision
Perhaps the most important information regarding stock prices is earnings
information. Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) observe the coex-
istence of return momentum and earnings momentum, namely, both past
stock return and past accounting performance predict future stock returns.
They examine revisions of earnings analyst forecasts across past return levels
during the one-year post-ranking period, and find that post-ranking earnings
revisions are more favorable for past winners than for past losers. An inter-
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national study by Hong, Lee, and Swaminathan (2003) studies eleven equity
markets and find that stock return momentum only exists in the markets
where earnings momentum is profitable, indicating that stock return mo-
mentum and earnings momentum share the same information dissemination
system.
Post-ranking earnings revision provides us with an ideal test vehicle not
only because earnings revision has implication on stock mispricing but also
because earnings revision, unlike stock return, is exogenous to institutional
trading. Under the hypothesis that institutional positive-feedback trading
improves the market efficiency, high MT past winners (losers) are more un-
derpriced (overpriced) than low MT past winners (losers), and institutional
positive-feedback trading helps adjust stock prices to their ’correct’ levels by
creating stronger momentum in high MT stocks. Therefore, in this case we
expect to observe that by positive-feedback trading, institutions buy (sell)
the past winners (losers) that will experience more favorable (unfavorable)
earnings revision during the post-ranking period than other past winners
(losers). As a result, if institutional positive-feedback trading improves the
market efficiency, we would expect the biggest difference in post-ranking
earnings revision between past winners and past losers to appear in the top
MT quintile. In other words, in this scenario the bigger return difference
between high MT past winners and past losers should be justified by the
stronger market underreaction and hence bigger difference in post-ranking
earnings revision.
Following Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) and Hong, Lee, and
Swaminathan (2003), I use the average one-year earnings forecasts in this
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Where ERit is earnings revision of firm i from month t− 1 to month t; EFit
and EFit−1 are the mean earnings forecasts of firm i in month t and t − 1,
respectively; Pit−1 is the stock price of firm i at the end of month t−1. ERit
is positive if analysts on average raise the earnings forecasts of firm i from
month t− 1 to month t and negative if they adjust the forecasts downwards.
One issue of equation (3) is that the mean forecasts before and after an
announcement date cover different fiscal years. To address this issue, when a
firm announces earning in month t, I treat earnings revision around month t
following Hong, Lee, and Swaminathan (2003): if the earnings announcement
date is before the I/B/E/S summary date, then earnings revision of month t is
calculated as the difference between mean one-year earnings forecast of month
t and mean two-year earnings forecast of month t−1 divided by the stock price
at the end of month t− 1. On the other hand, if the earnings announcement
date is after the I/B/E/S summary date, then earnings revision of month t
is still calculated following equation (3) but earnings revision of month t + 1
is calculated as the difference between mean one-year earnings forecast of
month t + 1 and mean two-year forecast of month t divided by the stock
price at the end of month t.
I begin by sorting stocks independently into quintiles of MT and past
six-month returns and examine the average earnings revisions during the
one-year period after portfolio formation. In particular, at the beginning
of month t, I independently sort stocks into quintiles of the MT measures
as well as cumulative returns in the past six months. Next, I examine the
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average earnings revisions for each month in the one-year period starting
from t and report the results in Panel A of Table 27.
Consistent with Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996), most of the
mean earnings revisions are negative, revealing the fact that initially over-
optimistic analysts gradually adjust their forecasts downwards to the ‘correct’
level. Moreover, within each MT quintile, earnings revisions are more favor-
able for winner stocks than for loser stocks in every of the twelve months
after portfolio formation, indicating market underreaction.
In order to examine whether institutional positive-feedback trading im-
proves market efficiency, I compare the differences in earnings revisions be-
tween winners and losers for the top and bottom MT quintiles and report
the results in Panel B. Table 27 Panel B shows that in five out of the twelve
months, the differences in earnings revisions between winners and losers are
actually smaller in the top MT quintile than in the bottom MT quintile.
Although the other seven of the twelve differences are positive, none of them
is significant at the standard levels.
Table 27 reveals that the stronger momentum generated by institutional
positive-feedback trading is not accompanied by the bigger difference in the
post-ranking earnings revision between winners and losers. Therefore, the
evidence from earnings revision is inconsistent with the hypothesis that in-
stitutional positive-feedback trading improves market efficiency.
2.3.2 Evidence from Long-Term Reversal of Momentum Profits
Extant research has observed that momentum profit reverts one year after
portfolio formation, which suggests that return momentum results from mis-
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pricing instead of risk.44 When the prices of winners and losers start to
converge back to the levels that correctly reflect firm fundamentals, momen-
tum profit reverts.
Interestingly, the model of Hong and Stein (1999) predicts that stocks that
attract more positive-feedback trading will experience deeper long-term re-
versal in momentum profits. This occurs in their model because the positive-
feedback traders push the past winners further up and beat the past losers
further down, thereby driving stock prices even further away from their fun-
damentals. This claim is consistent with the hypothesis that institutional
positive-feedback trading hampers market efficiency. If, on the contrary, in-
stitutional positive-feedback trading improves market efficiency and drives
the prices of underpriced (overpriced) winners (losers) further to their funda-
mental values, then we would expect no difference in the long-term reversals
of momentum profits for the stocks that experience different amount of in-
stitutional positive-feedback trading.
In order to examine the long-term reversals across different levels of in-
stitutional positive-feedback trading, I sort stocks into MT quintiles and ex-
amine the magnitudes of long term reversals in their momentum profits. In
particular, at the beginning of month t, I form five by five portfolios indepen-
dently on the MT measure and past six-month stock returns, and calculate
cumulative momentum profits (winners minus losers) for each MT quintile
up to each month in the three-year period from month t.
Table 28 reports the results. First, consistent with previous studies,
within each MT quintile the cumulative momentum profits peak in the
twelfth month after portfolio formation and then slowly drift downwards.
44See, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) for the analysis of long term reversal
in momentum profit.
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The right most column reports the change in cumulative momentum prof-
its from the twelfth month to the thirty-sixth month. All the changes are
negative, reflecting long-term reversals in momentum profits.
Second, the pattern of long term reversals across different MT levels is
evident: the magnitudes of the reversals are increasing with MT level, from
−3.44% of the bottom MT quintile to −6.36% of the top MT quintile. This
result indicates that stocks that receive more institutional positive-feedback
trading experience much stronger reversals in momentum profits than stocks
lack of institutional positive-feedback trading.
In order to provide a clear view of this pattern, I plot long-term cu-
mulative momentum profits of the top and bottom MT quintile during the
three-year post-formation period. Figure 2 shows very clearly that the top
MT quintile exhibits much deeper reversal than the bottom MT quintile: al-
though returns of the top MT quintile reaches a much higher peak than that
of the bottom MT quintile, the two return sequences reach approximately
the same low levels three years after portfolio formation.
To summarize, this subsection shows that stocks subject to stronger in-
stitutional positive-feedback trading exhibit much deeper long-term reversal
in momentum profits during the three-year post-ranking period. This re-
sult is consistent with hypothesis that institutional positive-feedback trading
hampers market efficiency.
2.3.3 The Relationship Between MT and FIT Measures
Chapter one presents evidence that higher fraction of institutional trading
volume leads to greater price efficiency and therefore lower momentum. This
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result suggests that institutions act as rational traders in generals. Chapter
two shows that although institutions are in general rational traders, their
particular trading behaviors could still hamper price efficiency. For exam-
ple, when institutional act as positive-feedback traders, their trend-chasing
behavior intensifies momentum and therefore hampers price efficiency. Since
both the MT measure and the FIT measure affect the magnitudes of mo-
mentum, I examine the relationship of these two measures.
First, I calculate the correlation between the FIT measure and the MT
measure, which is as low as 0.005, indicating that the two measures are
not correlated. This results show that stocks with higher fraction of insti-
tutional trading volume are not the stocks subject to stronger institutional
positive-feedback trading. This result is consistent with the discussion in the
dissertation that the effect of positive-feedback trading on momentum is not
necessarily the evidence that institutions overall hamper price efficiency be-
cause positive-feedback trading is only one of the many institutional trading
strategies.
Second, I calculate the momentum profits across the stocks two-dimensionally
sorted on the FIT measure and the MT measure. In particular, At the be-
ginning of month t, I independently sort stocks into three groups of the MT
measures, three groups of one-quarter lag FIT measures, and quintiles of
cumulative returns over the six-month period up to the end of month t-1.
Following the six-month holding/six-month formation strategy of Jegadeesh
and Titman (2001), I hold these three-dimensionally sorted portfolios for six
months.
Table 29 Panel A reports the average monthly returns of the portfolios
and Panel B reports the comparisons of momentum profits across the FIT-
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MT groups. The results show that the effects of the FIT measure and the
MT measure on stock return momentum are independent of each other.
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3 Conclusion
My dissertation studies the the effects of institutional trading on stock price
efficiency. I find that institutional trading has significant yet complicated
impact on price efficiency. In particular, institutional trading in general
improves price efficiency. For example, major stock market anomalies such
as stock return momentum, post earnings announcement drift, and the book-
to-market effect are much stronger in stocks with lower institutional trading
volume. However, some institutional trading behaviors could hamper stock
price efficiency even though institutions are generally rational arbitrageurs.
Specifically, I show that when institutions act as positive-feedback traders,




Figure 1: Fitted Distributions of Earnings-Announcement Returns Across
FIT Levels
This table presents the fitted distributions of the four-day returns around
earnings-announcements across FIT levels. I calculate the four-day market
model adjusted abnormal returns around quarterly earnings announcements
for the sample firms. Then for each month, I sort firms with quarterly
earnings-announcements in that month into deciles of one-quarter lag FIT.
I then pool the earnings-announcement returns for each FIT decile, fit these
returns into normal distribution, and plot the distributions across the FIT
deciles. FitRank1 represents the bottom FIT decile, FitRank4 represents
the 4th FIT decile, FitRank7 represents the 7th FIT decile, and FitRank10
represents the top FIT decile.
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Figure 2: Construction of the MT Measure
This figure illustrates the first three steps of constructing the MT measure.
There are in total eight quarters in the estimation period. I first calculate
institutional trading in each of the eight quarters and then sum up the absolute
value of the quarterly trading as shown in Panel A. Next, for each quarter of
the two-year estimation period, I calculate past performance index (PPindex)
and weight of the trading as shown in Panel B.
Panel A: Step One
Panel B: Step Two and Three
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Figure 3: Long-Term Momentum Profits Across MT Quintiles
This figure presents the long term momentum profits of the top (MT5) and
bottom (MT1) quintiles of the MT measure. At the beginning of month
t, I independently sort stocks into quintiles of the MT measures and past
six months’ cumulative stock returns. I then calculate within each MT
quintile the cumulative momentum profits (winners minus losers) up to each















































Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table summarizes FIT, FIB, FIS as well as firm characteristics of the sample, which con-
tains 236,908 firm-quarters during 1980 to 2005. FIT, FIB and FIS are calculated following
equations (1) to (6) in the paper. Betas of individual stocks are obtained from CRSP; Size
is the natural log of a firm’s market capitalization; BM/ME is calculated as the summation
of a firm’s book equity and deferred tax divided by the firm’s market equity; past return is
the cumulative return of a firm during the past six months. The residual analyst coverage
is calculated following Griffin and Lemmon (2002) by subtracting the average analyst cov-
erage of the NYSE size quartile of a firm from the firm’s analyst coverage. Turnover is the
total quarterly turnover calculated as the summation of the monthly turnovers during the
quarter, where monthly turnover is obtained by dividing the total trading volume of a firm
by its total shares outstanding. Idiosyncratic volatility is the monthly updated volatility
of residuals from the Fama-French 3 factor regression for the previous five-year estimation
period. Dividend yield is the dividend payment of a firm in the previous fiscal year divided
by its share price. Illiquid is the annual illiquidity measure (multiplied by 10.000) calculated
following Amihud (2002).
Variables Mean StDev P10 P25 Median P75 P90
FIT 0.54 0.41 0.04 0.23 0.49 0.75 1.03
FIB 0.28 0.23 0.01 0.10 0.24 0.39 0.56
FIS 0.25 0.21 0.01 0.07 0.21 0.35 0.51
Institutional Ownership 0.37 0.27 0.01 0.13 0.35 0.57 0.74
Quarterly Turnover 0.22 0.23 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.27 0.46
Beta 0.82 0.56 0.15 0.41 0.77 1.15 1.55
Ln(ME) 20.03 1.58 18.14 18.81 19.85 21.02 22.18
BM 0.73 0.53 0.23 0.39 0.63 0.95 1.34
Ret(-6,-1) 0.10 0.33 -0.20 -0.06 0.07 0.21 0.42
Residual Analyst Coverage -0.03 5.32 -5.33 -2.69 -0.52 2.45 6.33
Stock Price 40.23 883.24 9.13 13.63 21.75 34.00 50.25
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.14
Dividend 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.08
Illiq 2.16 2.61 0.29 0.59 1.30 2.73 5.06
75
Table 2: Firm Characteristics Across FIT Levels
This table reports firms characteristics across FIT quintiles. Time-series means and t-statistics of
the cross-sectional averages are reported. Betas of individual stocks are obtained from CRSP; Size
is the natural log of a firm’s market capitalization; BM/ME is calculated the summation of a firm’s
book equity and deferred tax divided by the firm’s market equity; past return is the cumulative
return of a firm during the past six months. The residual analyst coverage is calculated following
Griffin and Lemmon (2002) by subtracting the average analyst coverage of the NYSE size quartile
of a firm from the firm’s analyst coverage. Turnover is the total quarterly turnover calculated as
the summation of the monthly turnovers during the quarter, where monthly turnover is obtained by
dividing the total trading volume of a firm by its total shares outstanding. Idiosyncratic volatility is
the monthly updated volatility of residuals from a Fama-French 3 factor regression for the previous
five-year estimation period. Dividend yield is the dividend payment of a firm in the previous fiscal
year divided by its share price. Illiquid is the annual illiquidity measure calculated following Amihud
(2002). Since Illiquidity levels vary over time with total market volumes, I transfer the illiquidity
measures into standardized ranks between 0 and 1 following Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok
(1996).
Variables Low FIT 2 3 4 High FIT High-Low t-stat
FIB 0.03 0.16 0.26 0.36 0.56 0.53 94.92
FIS 0.03 0.14 0.24 0.33 0.51 0.48 82.18
Institutional Ownership 0.06 0.30 0.43 0.49 0.48 0.42 48.07
Quarterly Turnover 0.20 0.29 0.23 0.19 0.14 -0.06 -23.47
Beta 0.62 0.88 0.93 0.92 0.79 0.17 10.90
Ln(ME) 18.96 19.76 20.45 20.54 20.12 1.16 38.54
BM 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.75 0.01 1.30
Ret(-6,-1) 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.09 -0.01 -1.38
Residual Analyst Coverage -1.62 0.34 1.25 0.75 -0.70 0.92 12.00
Stock Price 20.04 26.03 31.47 35.58 81.62 61.58 10.09
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.00 -1.28
Dividend 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -13.88
SP500Dummy 0.02 0.15 0.31 0.33 0.19 0.18 16.41








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Quarterly Fama-Macbeth Regressions: Determinants of Trader
Composition
This table presents quarterly Fama-Macbeth regressions of FIT (M1-M4), FIB (M5-M6) and FIS (M7-
M8). FITt−1, FIBt−1, and FISt−1 are one quarter lags. IOt−1 is institutional ownership at the end
of quarter t-1. Beta is estimated using the daily returns in the previous calendar year. Ln(ME)t−1
is the natural log of market capitalization at the end of quarter t-1. Ln(BM) is BE/ME. Ret6 is
six-month return up quarter t-1. Prct−1 is stock price at the end of quarter t-1. ResAC is residual
analyst coverage at the end of quarter t-1. S&P500 is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is
part of S&P500 composite index. V olatility is CAPM ideosyncratic volatility. Dividend is dividend
yield. illiq is Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity measure. Average Adj. R-square is the time series averages.
In order to facilitate the estimation of economic significance, I follow Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok
(1996) to transform the independent variables into standardized ranks between 0 and 1. t-statistics
are calculated based on Newey-West standard errors.
FIT Regressions FIB Regressions FIS Regressions
Models M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8
FITt−1 0.9337 0.7627 0.8879
t-stat (31.13) (23.94) (16.56)
FIBt−1 0.2612 0.2863 0.2364 0.2670
t-stat (34.35) (27.12) (22.88) (15.96)
FISt−1 0.2120 0.2429 0.1646 0.1979
t-stat (17.44) (13.90) (22.55) (15.87)
IOt−1 0.2323 0.6742 0.2341 0.0406 0.0416 0.1557 0.1570
t-stat (7.00) (23.07) (7.16) (3.11) (3.30) (8.03) (8.30)
Beta -0.0547 -0.1000 -0.0561 -0.0215 -0.0222 -0.0243 -0.0251
t-stat (-8.41) (-8.29) (-8.54) (-6.62) (-6.79) (-8.23) (-8.55)
Ln(ME)t−1 0.0261 0.1016 0.0235 0.0012 0.0008 0.0181 0.0173
t-stat (1.70) (4.80) (1.66) (0.14) (0.09) (4.20) (4.37)
Ln(BM) 0.0240 0.0497 0.0238 0.0156 0.0157 0.0013 0.0012
t-stat (2.83) (2.87) (2.76) (3.69) (3.64) (0.27) (0.26)
Ret6 -0.0188 -0.0716 -0.0188 0.0089 0.0087 -0.0274 -0.0277
t-stat (-2.87) (-6.58) (-2.90) (1.87) (1.81) (-8.05) (-8.42)
Prct−1 -0.0271 -0.1033 -0.0268 -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0182 -0.0185
t-stat (-1.16) (-2.16) (-1.14) (-0.37) (-0.37) (-2.02) (-2.02)
ResAC -0.0772 -0.1480 0.0628 -0.0265 0.0368 -0.0404 0.0314
t-stat (-18.63) (-13.12) (1.96) (-9.18) (2.27) (-19.39) (1.61)
S&P500 -0.0783 -0.1577 -0.0769 -0.0293 -0.0293 -0.0393 -0.0394
t-stat (-12.62) (-9.78) (-12.37) (-11.60) (-11.70) (-11.51) (-11.54)
V olatility -0.1046 -0.2569 -0.1003 -0.0545 -0.0528 -0.0409 -0.0392
t-stat (-15.30) (-12.81) (-14.73) (-13.34) (-12.52) (-11.69) (-11.51)
Dividend -0.0731 -0.1423 -0.0737 -0.0468 -0.0474 -0.0148 -0.0153
t-stat (-8.20) (-7.52) (-7.60) (-8.59) (-8.18) (-4.92) (-4.44)
Illiq 0.1381 0.2625 0.1360 0.0566 0.0557 0.0578 0.0568
t-stat (10.42) (8.88) (10.86) (9.16) (9.44) (8.10) (8.36)
ResAC ∗ FIT -0.2424
t-stat (-4.12)
ResAC ∗ FIB -0.0486 -0.0598
t-stat (-2.46) (-2.83)
ResAC ∗ FIS -0.0606 -0.0641
t-stat (-3.84) (-3.98)





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Stock Returns of Portfolios Double Sorted on FIT and Illiquidity
This table reports the average monthly stock returns of portfolios two-dimensionally sorted on lag
FIT and stock illiquidity. Each month, I sort stocks into deciles of lag of the previous quarter and
calculate average monthly stock returns for each two-dimensional portfolios. The stock illiquidity
measure is calculated following Amihud (2002). I then report the time series means and t-statistics
of the cross-sectional return averages. All the t-statistics are calculated with Newey-West robust
standard errors.
Low FIT 2 3 4 High FIT High-Low t-stat
Liquid 0.67 0.93 1.19 1.24 1.36 0.69 (2.63)
2 0.65 1.04 1.25 1.36 1.47 0.82 (4.85)
3 0.72 0.96 1.30 1.39 1.36 0.64 (3.91)
4 0.97 1.28 1.58 1.39 1.47 0.49 (3.11)











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9: Quarterly Fama-Macbeth Regressions: Momentum and Trader
Composition
This table reports quarterly Fama-Macbeth regressions of stock returns (constants not reported). The
independent variable is quarterly cumulative stock returns (%). The independent variables are measured
at the end of the previous quarter. Each quarter I run a cross sectional regression and then calculate
time series means and t-stats of the coefficients. FIT, FIB and FIS are calculated following equations
(1) to (6) in the paper. Betas are obtained from CRSP; ME is a firm’s market capitalization; BM is
the book-to-market ratio. Ret(-6,-1) is the cumulative return of a firm during the past six months. IO
is the institutional ownership. ResAC is the residual analyst coverage. Turnover is the total quarterly
turnover. I follow Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) to transform the independent variables into
standardized ranks between 0 and 1. There is one-month interval before the return measurement period.
The t-statistics are calculated based on Newey-West standard errors.
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Ret(-6,-1) 4.61 3.77 4.84 6.25 4.99 5.09 6.18
t-stat (5.80) (5.00) (5.62) (6.23) (5.71) (5.64) (6.05)
Beta -0.57 -0.82 -0.65 -0.48 -0.60 -0.67 -0.51
t-stat (-0.63) (-0.93) (-0.76) (-0.62) (-0.66) (-0.78) (-0.65)
Ln(ME)(t-1) -0.85 -0.90 -0.97 1.41 -0.95 -1.04 1.27
t-stat (-1.12) (-1.09) (-1.18) (1.60) (-1.24) (-1.27) (1.46)
BE/ME 1.46 1.46 1.43 1.95 1.44 1.42 1.96





FIT(t-1) 3.52 3.09 2.39
t-stat (5.02) (5.25) (4.20)
FIB(t-1) 1.82 1.61 1.00
t-stat (2.96) (2.81) (1.82)
FIS(t-1) 2.36 2.20 1.80
t-stat (3.99) (3.88) (3.24)
IO(t-1) 2.54 0.91 0.66 0.64 0.58
t-stat (3.03) (1.16) (0.92) (0.83) (0.84)
FIT(t-1)*Ret(-6,-1) -4.21 -3.88 -2.78
t-stat (-4.08) (-3.91) (-3.02)
FIB(t-1)*Ret(-6,-1) -1.98 -1.88 -0.94
t-stat (-2.07) (-1.96) (-1.01)
FIS(t-1)*Ret(-6,-1) -2.87 -2.81 -2.05
t-stat (-2.98) (-2.86) (-2.26)
IO(t-1)*Ret(-6,-1) -2.57 -0.69 0.10 -0.29 0.09






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11: Quarterly Fama-Macbeth Regressions: PEAD and Trader Com-
position
This table reports quarterly Fama-Macbeth regressions of stock returns (constants not reported). The
independent variable is quarterly cumulative stock returns (%). The independent variables are measured
at the end of the previous quarter. Each quarter I run a cross sectional regression and then calculate time
series means and t-stats of the coefficients. EarningsShock is the earnings-announcement shock measured
using the market model abnormal returns from two days prior to the quarterly announcement date to one
day after the announcement date. FIT, FIB, and FIS are calculated following equations (1) to (6) in the
paper. Betas are obtained from CRSP; ME is a firm’s market capitalization; BM is the book-to-market
ratio. Ret(-6,-1) is the cumulative return of a firm during the past six months. IO is the institutional
ownership. I follow Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) to transform the independent variables into
standardized ranks between 0 and 1. To facilitate the evaluation of economic significance, I follow Chan,
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) to transform the independent variables into standardized ranks between
0 and 1. To control for the microstructure effect, there is one-month interval before the return measurement
period. The t-statistics are calculated based on Newey-West standard errors.
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
EarningsShock 1.95 1.90 2.42 3.15 2.23 2.55 3.26
t-stat (4.28) (4.30) (4.68) (5.47) (4.28) (4.78) (5.49)
Beta -0.64 -0.85 -0.71 -0.70 -0.66 -0.72 -0.70
t-stat (-0.74) (-1.00) (-0.87) (-0.85) (-0.75) (-0.86) (-0.84)
Ln(ME)(t-1) -0.97 -1.01 -1.10 0.42 -1.09 -1.19 0.34
t-stat (-1.24) (-1.18) (-1.30) (0.46) (-1.37) (-1.38) (0.37)
BE/ME 1.34 1.36 1.33 1.33 1.32 1.31 1.31
t-stat (2.75) (2.77) (2.75) (2.76) (2.72) (2.76) (2.76)
Ret(-6,-1) 2.20 2.16 2.21 2.20 2.22 2.24 2.23
t-stat (3.52) (3.45) (3.56) (3.53) (3.53) (3.49) (3.46)
FIT(t-1) 2.54 1.94 1.80
t-stat (4.33) (3.74) (3.42)
FIB(t-1) 1.59 1.19 0.97
t-stat (2.65) (2.13) (1.73)
FIS(t-1) 1.51 1.26 1.28
t-stat (3.37) (2.65) (2.72)
IO(t-1) 2.22 1.29 0.71 1.11 0.57
t-stat (3.32) (2.05) (1.19) (1.80) (0.98)
FIT(t-1)*EarningsShock -2.63 -1.80 -1.54
t-stat (-3.80) (-2.43) (-1.99)
FIB(t-1)*EarningsShock -1.42 -0.79 -0.41
t-stat (-1.54) (-0.88) (-0.46)
FIS(t-1)*EarningsShock -1.73 -1.44 -1.45
t-stat (-2.34) (-1.89) (-1.95)
IO(t-1)*EarningsShock -2.40 -1.66 -0.50 -1.47 -0.37
t-stat (-3.44) (-2.17) (-0.70) (-1.92) (-0.52)
Ln(ME)(t-1)*EarningsShock -3.07 -3.07
t-stat (-4.17) (-4.13)






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 13: Monthly Fama-Macbeth Regressions: Value premium and Trader
Composition
This table reports monthly Fama-Macbeth regressions of stock returns (constants not reported). The
independent variable is monthly stock returns (%). The independent variables are measured at the
end of the previous month. Each month I run a cross sectional regression and then calculate time
series means and t-stats of the coefficients. FIT, FIB, and FIS are calculated following equations (1)
to (6) in the paper. Betas are obtained from CRSP; ME is a firm’s market capitalization; BM is the
book-to-market ratio. Ret(-6,-1) is the cumulative return of a firm during the past six months skipping
a month. IO is the institutional ownership at the beginning of the quarter. To facilitate the evaluation
economic significance, I follow Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) to transform the independent
variables into standardized ranks between 0 and 1. The t-statistics are calculated based on Newey-West
standard errors.
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
BE/ME 0.84 0.83 0.93 0.89 0.83 0.89 0.86
t-stat (3.63) (3.74) (3.82) (3.45) (3.68) (3.82) (3.50)
Beta -0.10 -0.19 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.14 -0.14
t-stat (-0.35) (-0.63) (-0.44) (-0.42) (-0.41) (-0.49) (-0.48)
Ln(ME)(t-1) -0.37 -0.38 -0.42 -0.46 -0.39 -0.43 -0.45
t-stat (-1.45) (-1.39) (-1.53) (-1.40) (-1.52) (-1.60) (-1.41)
Ret(-6,-1) 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.73 0.74 0.74
t-stat (3.11) (3.06) (3.16) (3.16) (3.24) (3.32) (3.32)
FIT(t-1) 0.92 0.71 0.70
t-stat (3.92) (2.99) (2.94)
FIB(t-1) 0.31 0.20 0.18
t-stat (1.70) (1.09) (0.98)
FIS(t-1) 0.70 0.60 0.61
t-stat (3.80) (3.24) (3.31)
IO(t-1) 0.79 0.38 0.40 0.33 0.33
t-stat (3.52) (1.70) (1.65) (1.58) (1.46)
FIT(t-1)*BM -0.79 -0.56 -0.54
t-stat (-3.02) (-1.89) (-1.84)
FIB(t-1)*BM -0.29 -0.17 -0.14
t-stat (-1.20) (-0.69) (-0.57)
FIS(t-1)*BM -0.56 -0.45 -0.45
t-stat (-2.21) (-1.69) (-1.71)
IO(t-1)*BM -0.73 -0.40 -0.43 -0.36 -0.36
t-stat (-2.67) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.21) (-1.15)
Ln(ME)(t-1)*BM 0.09 0.04
t-stat (0.31) (0.15)












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 17: Calculation of PPIndex
In each cross-section, I put stocks into ten portfolios according to their cumulative
returns during the past six months. The portfolios are sorted in ascending order
from extreme past losers to extreme past winners. Then I assign discrete PPIndex
from -5 to 5 to the past-return portfolios, where -5 is assigned to the bottom past-
return decile and 5 assigned to the top past-return decile.
Return Portfolios Loser 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Winner
Ppindex -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5
Table 18: Summary Statistics of the MT Measure
I calculate the MT measure for each firm-quarter during the 1982-2005 on a two-year rolling
basis following equation (1). In particular, for each individual stock I calculate the MT
measures during two-year estimation periods and apply them to the subsequent quarters.
This table reports for the first quarter of every three-year period the number of firms as well
as mean, standard deviation, t-statistic, median, 10% cutoff, 1/4 quartile, 3/4 quartile and
90% cutoff of the MT measures. I also report these statistics for the whole sample period.
There are in total 367,337 firm-quarter observations with available MT measure.
Quarter Obs Mean Std. t-stat 10P 25P Median 75P 90P
Total 367,337 0.31 2.31 81.88 -2.62 -1.27 0.25 1.87 3.52
1st Quarter, 1982 2,552 0.39 2.24 8.91 -2.35 -1.14 0.35 1.98 3.45
1st Quarter, 1985 2,786 0.38 2.20 9.13 -2.37 -1.09 0.37 1.82 3.24
1st Quarter, 1988 3,088 0.23 2.25 5.63 -2.57 -1.27 0.17 1.62 3.33
1st Quarter, 1991 3,145 0.33 2.30 8.16 -2.64 -1.22 0.36 1.88 3.43
1st Quarter, 1994 3,720 0.38 2.33 9.99 -2.62 -1.23 0.27 1.98 3.81
1st Quarter, 1997 4,731 0.37 2.37 10.72 -2.54 -1.29 0.14 2.00 4.00
1st Quarter, 2000 4,999 0.31 2.24 9.64 -2.53 -1.19 0.25 1.76 3.35
1st Quarter, 2003 4,499 0.15 2.42 4.06 -3.14 -1.56 0.19 1.82 3.36
91
Table 19: The MT Measure and Firm Characteristics
This table describes the relationships between the MT measures and firm
characteristics. In particular, for each month of the sample period, I sort
stocks into quintiles according to the MT measures of month t and calculate
average return, size, book-to-market ratio, demeaned turnover, coverage,
and MT measures of each quintile. The time series means and t-statistics
of the firm characteristics are reported. Return is stock return of month
t. Size is the natural log of market capitalization at the end of month t-1.
BE/ME is the book-to-market ratio of month t. Turnover is demeaned
turnover of month t-1. Coverage is the residual analyst coverage of month
t-1 calculated following Griffin and Lemmon (2002). RetVolty is return
volatility, measured as standard deviation of daily stock returns in the 25
trading days up to the end of month t-1. FirmAge is age of a firm measured
as the number of months from the firm’s first CRSP monthly return record.
MT Level Low 2 3 4 High High-Low t-stat
Return 1.01 1.21 1.25 1.17 1.17 0.16 0.87
Size 19.96 20.24 20.30 20.20 19.78 -0.18 -15.25
BM 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.63 0.57 -0.12 -18.49
Turnover 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.04 17.70
Coverage 0.64 0.36 0.32 0.14 -0.15 -0.79 -17.56
RetVolty 0.024 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.028 0.004 13.21
FirmAge 196 232 231 206 143 -53 -40.43
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 21: Six-Month/Six-Month Strategy: Two-Dimensional Sort on Size
and MT: 1982-2005
At the beginning of month t, I sort stocks independently into three groups of the MT measure, three
groups of market capitalization at the end of month t-1, and quintiles of cumulative returns over the
six-month perioud up to the end of month t-1. Following the six-month-holding/six-month-formation
strategy of Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), I hold these three-dimensionally sorted portfolios for six
months. Panel A reports the average monthly returns of the portfolios and Panel B reports the compar-
isons of momentum profits across the size-MT groups. Average size and average MT are measured in
decile ranks. Specifically, I assign deciles ranks of size and MT to the stocks in each cross-section, where
1 is assigned to the bottom deicle and 10 to the top decile. I then calculate time series averages of the
cross sectional mean ranks of size and MT for each size-MT group.
Panel A: Momentum Profits Across Size-MT groups
Size MT Loser 2 3 4 Winner W-L t-stat Ave.Size Ave.MT
Small Low 0.65 1.15 1.13 1.32 1.64 0.99 (3.52) 2.17 2.07
Small Med 0.85 1.24 1.33 1.49 1.78 0.93 (3.67) 2.28 5.51
Small High 0.36 1.05 1.22 1.40 1.80 1.44 (5.90) 2.18 9.01
Med. Low 0.82 1.20 1.26 1.20 1.51 0.69 (2.44) 5.48 2.20
Med. Med 0.78 1.25 1.32 1.39 1.70 0.92 (3.39) 5.54 5.51
Med. High 0.62 1.05 1.21 1.31 1.69 1.07 (3.72) 5.48 8.79
Big Low 1.03 1.26 1.26 1.27 1.41 0.37 (1.25) 8.81 2.35
Big Med 0.96 1.25 1.34 1.31 1.54 0.58 (1.94) 8.86 5.49
Big High 0.79 1.19 1.24 1.23 1.60 0.81 (2.48) 8.70 8.54
Panel B: Comparisons of Momentum Profits
Size Level
Small Med. Big S-B t-stat
Low 0.99 0.69 0.37 0.62 (3.60)
MT level Med. 0.93 0.92 0.58 0.35 (1.89)
High 1.44 1.07 0.81 0.63 (2.99)
H-L 0.45 0.38 0.44
t-stat (2.73) (2.38) (2.22)
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Table 22: Six-Month/Six-Month Strategy: Two-Dimensional Sort on the
Book-to-Market Ratio and MT: 1982-2005
This table presents momentum profits across BM-MT groups. At the beginning of month t, I indepen-
dently sort stocks into three groups of the MT measures, three groups of book-to-market ratios, and
quintiles of cumulative returns over the six-month period up to the end of month t-1. Following the
six-month holding/six-month formation strategy of Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), I hold these three-
dimensionally sorted portfolios for six months. Panel A reports the average monthly returns of the
portfolios and Panel B reports the comparisons of momentum profits across the BM-MT groups. Av-
erage book-to-market ratio and average MT are measured in decile ranks. Specifically, I assign deciles
ranks of the book-to-market ratio and MT to the stocks in each cross-section, where 1 is assigned to the
bottom deicle and 10 to the top decile. I then calculate time series averages of the cross-sectional mean
ranks of the book-to-market ratio and MT for each BM-MT group. Book-to-market ratio is calculated
by dividing the summation of fiscal year-end book equity and deferred tax by market equity. I then
apply the book-to-market ratio at the fiscal year end of year t to the one year period starting from July
of year t+1.
Panel A: Momentum Profits Across BM-MT groups
BM MT Loser 2 3 4 Winner W-L t-stat Ave.BM Ave.MT
Low Low 0.63 1.04 1.05 1.11 1.28 0.65 (2.19) 2.25 2.19
Low Med 0.62 0.94 1.16 1.29 1.57 0.95 (3.24) 2.27 5.60
Low High 0.15 0.64 0.93 1.16 1.53 1.39 (4.73) 2.12 8.96
Med. Low 1.07 1.26 1.32 1.28 1.66 0.59 (2.02) 5.53 2.26
Med. Med 1.04 1.33 1.38 1.35 1.67 0.64 (2.33) 5.52 5.54
Med. High 0.79 1.10 1.19 1.28 1.60 0.82 (2.83) 5.45 8.76
High Low 1.08 1.39 1.36 1.38 1.54 0.46 (1.68) 8.84 2.24
High Med 1.24 1.46 1.44 1.52 1.64 0.41 (1.57) 8.76 5.53
High High 1.03 1.46 1.46 1.47 1.91 0.88 (2.95) 8.78 8.72
Panel B: Comparisons of Momentum Profits
BM Level
Low Med. High L-H t-stat
Low 0.65 0.59 0.46 0.19 (0.93)
MT level Med. 0.95 0.64 0.41 0.54 (2.54)
High 1.39 0.82 0.88 0.51 (2.22)
H-L 0.74 0.23 0.41
t-stat (4.00) (1.28) (2.02)
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Table 23: Six-Month/Six-Month Strategy: Two-Dimensional Sort on
Turnover and MT: 1982-2005
This table presents momentum profits across turnover-MT groups. At the beginning of month t, I
independently sort stocks into three groups of the MT measures, three groups of turnovers of month t-1,
and quintiles of cumulative returns over the six-month period up to the end of month t-1. Following the
six-month holding/six-month formation strategy of Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), I hold these three-
dimensionally sorted portfolios for six months. Panel A reports the average monthly returns of the
portfolios and Panel B reports the comparisons of momentum profits across the turnover-MT groups.
Average turnover and average MT are measured in decile ranks. Specifically, I assign deciles ranks of
turnover and MT to the stocks in each cross-section, where 1 is assigned to the bottom deicle and 10 to
the top decile. I then calculate time series averages of the cross-sectional mean ranks of turnover and
MT for each turnover-MT group. Turnovers are demeaned by the cross sectional average turnovers of
NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ stocks according to the market where the firms is listed.
Panel A: Momentum Profits across Turnover-MT groups
TO MT Loser 2 3 4 Winner W-L t-stat Ave.TO Ave.MT
Low Low 0.85 1.20 1.22 1.31 1.45 0.60 (2.59) 2.21 2.24
Low Med 1.00 1.26 1.35 1.41 1.59 0.59 (2.81) 2.23 5.47
Low High 0.98 1.28 1.37 1.47 1.70 0.72 (3.36) 2.14 8.64
Med. Low 0.92 1.27 1.25 1.31 1.54 0.61 (2.49) 5.49 2.24
Med. Med 0.97 1.31 1.36 1.44 1.64 0.67 (2.77) 5.46 5.48
Med. High 0.72 1.26 1.30 1.33 1.66 0.93 (3.58) 5.56 8.67
High Low 0.64 1.04 1.11 1.21 1.55 0.91 (2.81) 8.70 2.12
High Med 0.63 1.07 1.28 1.32 1.73 1.09 (3.74) 8.71 5.53
High High 0.20 0.78 0.98 1.17 1.69 1.49 (5.10) 8.92 8.97
Panel B: Comparisons of Momentum Profits
Turnover Level
Low Med. High H-L t-stat
Low 0.60 0.61 0.91 0.31 (1.64)
MT level Med. 0.59 0.67 1.09 0.51 (2.85)
High 0.72 0.93 1.49 0.77 (3.87)
H-L 0.12 0.32 0.59

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 29: Six-Month/Six-Month Strategy: Two-Dimensional Sort on FIT
and MT: 1982-2005
This table presents momentum profits across FIT-MT groups. At the beginning of month t, I indepen-
dently sort stocks into three groups of the MT measures, three groups of one-quarter lag FIT measures,
and quintiles of cumulative returns over the six-month period up to the end of month t-1. Following the
six-month holding/six-month formation strategy of Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), I hold these three-
dimensionally sorted portfolios for six months. Panel A reports the average monthly returns of the
portfolios and Panel B reports the comparisons of momentum profits across the FIT-MT groups.
Panel A: Momentum Profits across FIT-Inst.Ownership groups
FIT MT Loser 2 3 4 Winner W - L t-stat
Low Low 0.74 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.36 0.62 (2.68)
Low Med 0.76 1.07 1.18 1.19 1.59 0.83 (3.46)
Low High 0.58 1.01 1.15 1.22 1.78 1.21 (5.06)
2 Low 1.15 1.33 1.35 1.27 1.46 0.32 (1.56)
2 Med 1.10 1.34 1.46 1.36 1.52 0.42 (2.16)
2 High 0.96 1.35 1.42 1.40 1.55 0.59 (2.80)
High Low 1.27 1.31 1.32 1.32 1.47 0.20 (1.08)
High Med 1.23 1.44 1.41 1.43 1.58 0.35 (2.00)
High High 1.22 1.44 1.48 1.48 1.76 0.53 (2.90)
Panel B: Matrix of Momentum Profits
FIT Level
Low Med. High L-H t-stat
Low 0.62 0.32 0.20 0.42 (2.42)
MT Level Med. 0.83 0.42 0.35 0.48 (2.65)
High 1.21 0.59 0.53 0.67 (3.89)
H-L 0.58 0.27 0.33
t-stat (3.27) (1.77) (2.22)
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